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THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE'S 

"POLITICS" AND "ETHICS" 

ON SPENSER 



A DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 

OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH 



BY 

WILLIAM FENN DeMOSS 



Private Edition, Distributed By 

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 



Reprinted in part from 

Modern Philology, Vol. XVI, Nos. i and 5 

May and September, 1918 



Zbc JUnivctsit^ ot Cbicaao 



THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE'S 

"POLITICS" AND "ETHICS" 

ON SPENSER 

A DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 

OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH 



BY 

WILLIAM FENN DeMOSS 



Private Edition, Distributed By 

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 



Reprinted in part from 

Modern Philology, Vol. XVI, Nos. i and s 

May and September, 19 18 



C^^Oa 









Gift 

University 



Composed and Printed By 

The University of Chicago Pren 

Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. 



PREFACE 

The main part of this thesis, the discussion of Aristotle's influ- 
ence on the Faerie Queene, was written in reply to an article by 
Ambassador J. J. Jusserand, in Modem Philology, Volume III, and 
was published in the same journal in May and September of 1918. 

I am principally indebted to my teachers. Professors John 
Matthews Manly and Charles Read BaskerviU, who have made 
valuable suggestions, and to my wife, Irene C. DeMoss, who has 
rendered valuable assistance, and whose intelligent interest has been 
a source of inspiration. 



CONTENTS 

PAOB 

Introduction 1 

Aristotle's Influence on the Faerie Queene 7 

"Mutability" 49 

A Veue of the Present State of Ireland 65 

The Shepheardes Calender and the Minor Poems 69 



INTRODUCTION 

The age in which Spenser lived must be kept in mind by him who 
would understand Spenser's works. Like other men of genius, 
Spenser was greatly influenced by his time. 

The central purpose of the Faerie Queene, set forth in the famous 
letter to Raleigh, is a case in point. Spenser tells us, "The generall 
end ... . of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble person 
in vertuous and gentle discipline." This purpose, together with 
Spenser's plan for carrying it out, strongly reflects the outlook which, 
in the Renaissance, had been produced by the study of philosophy. 
The problem which Spenser undertakes was regarded, both at home 
and abroad, as of paramount importance.^ All serious writers of 
the Renaissance had written educational treatises more or less like 
the Faerie Queene. Such are Skelton's Magnyfycence, Elyot's 
Governour, Wilson's Rhetorique, Castiglione's Courtier (translated 
into English in 1561), and Ascham's Schoolmaster. These works, 
like Spenser's, teach virtues and have in view the ideal man. The 
novels of the period, for example Lyly's Euphues and Sidney's 
Arcadia, reflect the same serious purpose. The esteem in which such 
studies were held is indicated by the fact that Ascham, in his School- 
master, approved heartily of Castiglione's Courtier, and Sidney 
carried the Courtier always in his pocket when he went abroad.^ 
The teaching of morals, including manners, was of vital interest. 
Erasmus, that typical figure of the Renaissance, held moral and 
religious training to be the highest purpose of all right education. 
The systematic teaching of morals, from ethical writers, historians, 
and poets, formed an important part of a classical education in the 
Renaissance.' British schools, including Cambridge and Oxford 
universities, gave much attention to the teaching of morals and 

1 See J. J. Jusserand's A Literary History of the English People, II (London and New 
York, 1906). 476. 

J See W. H. Woodward. Education during the Renaissance, Cambridge, 1906. p. 295. 
» See Woodward, op. cit., p. 125. 

1 



2 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

manners.^ Again, the aristocratic element in Spenser's purpose — 
the design to "fashion a gentleman or noble person" — reflects the 
spirit of the Renaissance. Elyot writes to teach virtues to those 
who are to have "authority in a weal public. "^ Skelton's hero is a 
prince. Castiglione's courtier and statesman is of noble birth. 
Lyly's Euphues is aristocratic, as is also Sidney's Arcadia. The con- 
ception that poetry should teach, implied in Spenser's purpose, 
shows the influence of the Renaissance. It has its classical basis 
in Aristotle (Ethics and Politics) and in Horace. Once more, the 
omniscience which Spenser's purpose requires of a gentleman or 
noble person reflects the Renaissance. The Renaissance, with the 
"perfyte man" in view, felt that a nobleman should know well- 
nigh everything.^ This belief, drawn from the ancients, largely 
from Aristotle, was encouraged by the example of the court during 
the reigns of the learned Henry VIII and Elizabeth. "Never," 
says Roger Ascham, "has the English nobility been so learned."* 
Spenser, as is shown in his letter to Raleigh, has it in mind to fashion 
a gentleman, or noble person, 'perfected' in all virtues, both moral 
and political — perfect in morals, manners, divinity, and statesman- 
ship — the perfect man. 

Another thing which shows how Spenser was influenced by his 
time is his choice of a master. In telling, in the letter to Raleigh, 
how he intends to "fashion a gentleman," he says, "I labour to 
pourtraict in Arthure, before he was king, the image of a brave 
knight, perfected in the twelve private morall vertues, as Aristotle 
hath devised, the which is the purpose of these first twelve bookes: 
which if I finde to be well accepted, I may be perhaps encoraged, to 
frame the other part of polliticke vertues in his person, after that hee 
came to be king," etc. From this it would seem that Spenser 
intended to follow not only Aristotle's treatment of the moral virtues 
but also his discussion of politics. 

Aristotle and Plaito were the great teachers of the Renaissance. 
There were, to be sure, attacks upon Aristotle. But people attack 
what is important. Besides, these attacks would have little influence 

» See Jusserand, op. cit., II, 49 ff. 

« See also Ibid., p. 67. 

« Ibid., pp. 65 fl. « Ibid., p. 73. 



INTRODUCTION 3 

upon the conservative Spenser. The popularity of Aristotle in 
1520 is proved by the daybook of John Dome, bookseller, which 
shows several sales in that- year. ^ We know that Aristotle was 
popular in 1551, a year or two before Spenser's birth, and in 1598, 
the year before Spenser's death. In 1551 a series of lectures on 
Aristotle was delivered at Cologne; and at this same period, as 
Roger Ascham tells us, Aristotle and Plato were read by English 
children, in Greek.^ In 1598, as the Stationers' Register shows, there 
was a translation of Aristotle into English.* Cambridge University, 
as Mulcaster tells us, had, in the reign of Henry VIII, taught the 
old axioms of Aristotle, "till in process of time good letters were 
brought in." The new course of study included Mathematics, 
etc., "as also Aristotle in a new dress, and some skill in the Greek 
Tongue."* Another thing which shows Renaissance regard for 
Aristotle is the influence of the Ethics and Politics on educational 
treatises and other works of the time. Elyot's Governour draws 
freely upon Aristotle. Moreover, the author recommends that by 
the time the boy is seventeen years old he shall have read to him 
moral philosophy, especially Aristotle's Ethics, Books I and II, to 
teach him "reason."^ Skelton's Magnyfycence shows Aristotelian 
influence, as does also Jonson's Cynthias Revels.^ Sidney's Arcadia 
certainly reflects Aristotle. Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique is largely 
from Aristotle. Ascham's Schoolmaster is strongly Aristotelian, 
and Castiglione's Courtier is almost wholly from Aristotle. This 
is only a little of the evidence that could be adduced to show how the 
Renaissance regarded Aristotle. Woodward, in his Education during 
the Renaissance, points out that the Renaissance held "three saUent 
characteristics" of the perfect man: (1) Aristotle's ntyaXo^^vxi-a, 
Magnanimity, or Highmindedness; (2) Aristotle's neydXoTrpiireLa, 
or Magnificence; and (3) Aristotle's <f>p6pri<XLs, Prudence, or Reason.' 

« Ibid., p. 55. 
»/6td.. pp. 74-75. 
«76id..p. 373. 

* "Babees Book," E.E.T.S., ed. Furnivall, Forewords, p. xxxix. 

» W. H. Woodward, Education during the Renaissance, Cambridge, 1906. p. 289. 

• See C. R. Baskervill, English Elements in Jonson's Early Comedy, Austin, Texas, 
1911. See also R. L. Ramsay's edition of Skelton's Magnyfycence, E.E.T.S., pp. xxxii- 
xxxviil. 

» Pp. 261-62. Cambridge. 1906. 



4 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Again, Spenser's mingling of classic and sacred teachings, most 
notably in Book I, where he treats Holiness as a moral virtue,^ is 
but another example of how he was influenced by his time. In the 
Renaissance men came to regard the great classical teachers almost 
as saints. Church fathers and divines made use of the teachings of 
Plato, and especially of Aristotle. As Jusserand puts it, ** Christian 
and pagan ideas mingle; the notion of sacrilege fades; men of culture 
call the mass 'Sacra Deorum'; Pulci dedicates his second canto to 
the 'sovereign Jupiter crucified for us.' "^ And we hear Erasmus say 
of the noble Socrates, "I can ofttimes scarcely refrain from saying, 
'Saint Socrates, pray for us."" 

Finally, the allegorical interpretation which Spenser puts upon 
Homer, Virgil, and others shows the English poet in agreement with 
his age. In the letter to Raleigh, Spenser says : 

I have followed all the antique Poets historicall, first Homere, who in the 
Persons of Agamemnon and Ulysses hath ensampled a good governour and 
a vertuous man, the one in his Ilias, the other in his Odysseis: then Vergil, 
whose like intention was to doe in the person of Aeneas, .... 

Erasmus shows the Renaissance tendency to see allegory everywhere. 
He says, "Homeric and Virgilian poems will not be of indifferent 
use to thee if thou rememberest that they were entirely allegorical."* 
Erasmus sees allegory and holiness in everything — even in Horace. 
Elyot says that Homer, "from whom as from a fountain preceded 
all eloquence and lernyng," offered "instruction for politic govern- 
ance of people."* Gavin Douglas strives to discover the mysterious 
meaning which he is sure is concealed in Virgil's words. He sees in 
Aeneas the "just perfyte man." For him each one of Aeneas' 
adventures holds a moral lesson; for what poets feign, he reasons, 
ever "bein full of secreyt onderstanding under hyd sentense or figur."^ 
And Fulke Greville, the intimate friend of Sidney, is certain that 
under the poetical trappings of Sidney's Arcadia are concealed pro- 
found moral intentions. He says, "In all these creatures of his 
making, his intent and scope was to turn the barren philosophy 



« Cf. the letter to Raleigh. < Jusserand, op. cit., II, 8. 

s Op. cit., II. 15. 6 Ibid., p. 68. 

« Ibid., II. 8. • Ibid., pp. 130 ff. 



INTRODUCTION 5 

precepts into pregnant images of life.''^ This Renaissance outlook 
was produced in some measure by Plato's practice of writing alle- 
gories. But Plato was rather hostile to poets, considering them 
incompetent to teach. This outlook comes really from Aristotle, 
who justifies not only this outlook in general, but also Spenser's 
interpretation of Homer in particular. Aristotle regarded the poets 
as moral and poUtical teachers. In fact he drew his conceptions in 
the Ethics and Politics largely from the Greek poets, especially from 
Homer. Spenser's conception that Homer is to be interpreted 
allegorically, and that he represented in Agamemnon "a good 
governour" and in Ulysses "a vertuous man," is justified by Aristotle 
as follows: Aristotle, in teaching the great central idea of his moral 
philosophy, the idea that a virtue is a mean between extremes, that 
prudence, or reason, is the determiner of the mean, and that one 
must keep farthest from the more dangerous of the two extremes by 
veering toward the less dangerous— in teaching this, Aristotle 
quotes the advice given to Ulysses preparatory to his sailing between 
Scylla and Charybdis, advice afterward repeated and followed by 
Ulysses. The part quoted is the admonition to Ulysses to keep far 
from Charybdis, the more dangerous of the two: 

Far from this smoke and swell keep thou thy bark. 
The account of the Odyssey shows that Ulysses is to take reason for 
his guide, and to shun Charybdis by going close to Scylla.^ Here is a 
justification not only for allegorical interpretation, but also for taking 
Ulysses as a representation of the "vertuous man." The case is 
no less clear for Agamemnon as "a good governour." Nor is there 
any doubt that Aristotle took Homer seriously as a teacher of poUtics. 
In the Politics he is discussing the Lacedemonian form of kingship, 
which is held to be a model. After describing it he says, "Such is 
the evidence of Homer. For although Agamemnon patiently endured 
reproaches in the assemblies, when the army was in the field his 
authority extended to life and death. Thus his [Agamemnon's] 
words are " Here he quotes Homer .» Again, in a passage 

> The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney, London, 1652. p. 18. 
» N. Eth., a. ix, and Odyssey, xii. especially 219-20. I refer to and quote J. E. C. 
Welldon's translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. 
« Politics, Book IV, chap. xiv. 



6 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

plainly implying that Agamemnon had both virtue and wisdom, 
Aristotle quotes the prayer which Homer puts into the mouth of 
Agamemnon, "Would I had ten such councillors as Nestor."^ 
Yet again, in the Ethics, in the discussion of Friendship, where he 
describes the three kinds of polities and the kind of friendship appro- 
priate to each, Aristotle illustrates his conception of the ideal king 
by quoting Homer, He says, "He [the good king] treats his sub- 
jects well, as being good, and as caring for their welfare, like a shep- 
herd for the welfare of his flock, whence Homer called Agamemnon 
'shepherd of the folk.'"^ Influenced by the Renaissance tendency 
toward allegorical interpretation, Spenser would certainly regard 
such passages as significant. Spenser, whom Milton found "sage 
and serious," whom Milton "dared be known to think a better 
teacher than Scotus or Aquinas,"^ was thinking and doing, with the 
added power of genius, just what his age was thinking and doing. 

1 Politics. Ill, xvii, and Iliad, x, 224. 
s N. Eth., VIII, xiu. 
• Areopagitica. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE FAERIE QUEENE 

In his article, entitled "Spenser's 'Twelve Private Morall Vertues 
as Aristotle hath Devised,'" Modern Philology, January, 1906, 
Ambassador Jusserand undertakes to prove that Spenser's solemn 
statement concerning the substance of the whole Faerie Queens, 
made to the poet's friend and patron Sir Walter Raleigh, at Raleigh's 
request, as M. Jusserand thinks, is "misleading, every word of it." 
Jusserand says: 

Spenser's statement [in the letter to Raleigh] that he intends "to por- 
traict in Arthur, before he was king, the image of a brave knight, perfected 
in the twelve private morall vertues as Aristotle hath devised" is misleading, 
every word of it. There is no such definite list; Aristotle's number is not 
twelve, and the virtues he studies are far from being the same as those form- 
ing the basis of the Faerie Queene} 

That Jusserand's paper has not been without its influence was 
shown in a recent article by Professor Erskine, of Columbia Univer- 
sity. Although Professor Erskine points out one false step in Jusse- 
rand's argument, he accepts his conclusion. In discussing "The 
Virtue of Friendship in the Faerie Queene," Publications of the Modern 
Language Association, XXIII (1915), 831-50, Professor Erskine 
asks, "Had Spenser read Montaigne, or Plutarch, or Cicero's On 
Friendship, or Aristotle's Ethics?" Replying to his own question 
he says, "He may have read them all, though M. Jusserand has 
taught us to suspect the Aristotle." Again, Erskine speaks of 
Jusserand's "having shown that Spenser did not get his list of virtues 
from Aristotle." 

It is the purpose of the present paper to show that not only 
are Jusserand's arguments faulty, but his conclusion is incorrect. 
Jusserand makes three main arguments: first, that Spenser's and 
Aristotle's lists of virtues are not the same in number; second, that 
they are quite unlike in nature; and, third, that Spenser actually 
derived his virtues, and his ideas concerning a list of twelve virtues, 

> Modern Philology, III. 376. 



8 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

from Lodowick Bryskett, who in his Discourse of Civil Life includes 
a discussion of moral virtues, in which the number twelve is men- 
tioned. 

I shall reply to these three main arguments in the order in which 
I have stated them. 

The first of Jusserand's three main arguments, that Spenser's 
and Aristotle's lists of virtues are not the same in number, falls into 
three subdivisions or arguments: first, that "Aristotle draws nowhere 
any dogmatic fist of virtues"; second, that it is difficult to know how 
to count Aristotle's virtues; and, third, that "Aristotle's number is 
not twelve," for, count his virtues as you will, you cannot get the 
number twelve. I take up the last subdivision first. 

Jusserand finds that nine of Aristotle's virtues are certainly 
virtues, but tliat there is some doubt concerning the remaining four: 
Temperance, or Self-control; Shame, or Modesty; Friendship; and 
Justice.^ Jusserand says: 

If we include both [Temperance and Modesty] we have a total of eleven; 
if we exclude both, a total of nine; if we admit Self-control alone, a total of 
ten. Adding arbitrarily Justice and Friendship, or only one of them .... 
we should have a total varying from ten to thirteen;^ a total of twelve being 
perhaps the most arbitrary of all and the most difficult to reach.' 

Now, it should be noted at the outset that a total of thirteen is 
exactly what we want. Spenser's total is not twelve. It is thirteen. 
In his letter to Raleigh, only a short distance from the assertion which 
Jusserand undertakes to disprove, Spenser makes the following 
statement: 

In the person of Prince Arthure I sette forth magnificence* in particular, 
which vertue for that (according to Aristotle and the rest) it is the perfection 
of all the rest, and conteineth in it them all, therefore, in the whole course 
I mention the deedes of Arthure applyable to that vertue, which I write of 
in that booke. But of the xii. other vertices,* I make xii. other knights the 
patrones, for the more variety of the history. 

» The fact that Spenser wrote a Book on each of these four virtues — see Faerie Queene, 
Books II, III, IV, and V — might be expected to throw some light on whether Spenser 
counted them as virtues or not. 

Hereafter references to book, canto, and stanza of the Faerie Queene are given with- 
out the title of the epic. 

^ Italics mine. 

« Mod. Phil.. Ill, 374-75. 

* Italics mine. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 9 

So much for Jusserand's point that "Aristotle's number is not 
twelve." Neither is Spenser's. We may now proceed to find what 
is the nature of Aristotle's Ust of virtues, how Aristotle's virtues are 
to be counted, and how Spenser got his number of virtues. 

In Book II, chap, vii, of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle dis- 
cusses a list of moral virtues or quaUties essential to the good man. 
They are exactly twelve in number: (1) Courage, (2) Temperance, or 
Self-control, (3) Liberality, (4) Magnificence, (5) Highmindedness, 
(6) the mean concerning Ambition, (7) Gentleness, or Mansuetude, 
(8) Truthfulness, (9) Wittiness, or Jocularity, (10) Friendliness, or 
Courtesy, (11) Modesty, or Shame, and (12) Righteous Indignation. 
Concerning this discussion Aristotle says: "For the present we are 
giving only a rough and summary account [of the virtues], and that 
is sufficient for our purpose; we will hereafter determine their char- 
acter more exactly."' We are promised, then, a careful discussion 
of the moral virtues "hereafter." In Book III, chaps, ixff.. Book 
IV, and Book V, Aristotle keeps his word. Moreover, an introduc- 
tory sentence and a concluding one mark the limits of this discussion 
of the moral virtues as definitely as two milestones. The first two 
sentences of III, ix, are as follows: "Let us then resume our con- 
sideration of the several virtues and discuss their nature, the subjects 
with which they deal, and the way in which they deal with them. 
In so doing we shall ascertain their number"^ The last sentence in 
Book V unmistakably closes the list of moral virtues: "This then 
may be taken as a sufficient description of Justice, and the other 
moral virtues." Between these two absolutely definite limits 
Aristotle discusses exactly twelve good quahties or desirable means. 
In this careful consideration of the moral virtues, the same good 
quahties, or desirable means, are hsted as in the less careful discussion 
which precedes it, with one exception: in the "rough and summary 
account" Righteous Indignation is included. We know from the 
Rhetoric that Aristotle decided that his discussion of this quahty 
was false, as Envy and Mahce, which he gave as its extremes, are 
not opposites, but compatible and coexistent.^ In his second 

> My quotations are from the translation by J. E. C. Welldon. 

' Italics mine. 

» See Aristotle's Rhetoric, Book II, chap. ix. 



10 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

discussion of the moral virtues, which is to " determine their character 
more exactly" and "ascertain their number," he omits Righteous 
Indignation and adds Justice, leaving the number unchanged. 
Surely there is enough here to suggest the number twelve if any 
such suggestion were needed. 

But Jusserand has difficulty in totalizing Aristotle's virtues, for 
he finds it hard to decide which ones are to be counted. In the first 
place, he contends that "Some of his virtues are only a branch or 

development of another virtue Magnificence is only the same 

as [Liberality], but practiced by the very rich, instead of by the 
moderately rich, man."^ Now it is plain that Aristotle's Mag- 
nificence and Liberality are not the same. It would be strange 
indeed if they were, since Aristotle treats them as two separate 
virtues. They are much the same in principle, as both imply being 
free in giving and spending. But practically they are very different. 
Anyone who gives to the right cause, at the right time, in the right 
manner, and to the right amount, considering the means of the giver, 
and who takes from right sources, is liberal. ^ He has to avoid the 
extremes of illiberality and prodigality. The magnificent man, on 
the other hand, must avoid the extremes of meanness and vulgar 
display, or bad taste. He must be a kind of artist. "The magnifi- 
cent man," says Aristotle, "is like a connoisseur in art; he has the 
faculty of perceiving what is suitable, and of spending large sums of 

money with good taste With equal expenditure he will make 

the result more magnificent."^ And, as we shall see later. Magnifi- 
cence includes far more than this. The poor widow who gave the 
mites was liberal ; but the problems she had to solve in being so were 
very different from those of a person who is in a position to practice 
the virtue of Magnificence and wishes to do so. 

Again, Jusserand objects, "Others .... are treated of quite 
apart, at great length; but it is not clear whether, if one wanted to 
do what Aristotle neglected to perform — that is, to tabulate his 
moral virtues — these should, or should not, be admitted in the list. 
Such is the case with Justice Such is the case also with 

» Mod. Phil.. Ill, 374-75. 

2 Nicomachean Ethics, IV, i-lii; II, vil. 

' Ibid., IV, iv-v; II, vii; Magna Moralia, I, 26; and Ethica Eudemia, III, vi. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 11 

Friendship Aristotle has treated them apart, and shown 

that he did not include them in his regular count. "^ 

Jusserand's assertion that Aristotle treated Justice apart from 
the other moral virtues is a misinterpretation. Justice is not 
separated from the preceding discussion in Books III and IV; on 
the contrary, it is in the closest possible way connected with it. 
In Book IV, chap, xiii, while discussing Truthfulness, Aristotle says: 
"We are not speaking of one who is truthful in legal covenants, or 
of all such matters as lie within the domain of justice and injustice, 
for these would be matters belonging to a different virtue." Again, 
the last sentence in Book IV is as follows: "But let us now proceed 
to consider Justice." Hence, one can no more draw a line between 
Books IV and V than between Books III and IV. Finally, the sen- 
tence which so clearly and definitely closes the discussion of the 
moral virtues is, as we have already seen, the last sentence in Book 
V: "This then may be taken as a sufficient description of Justice, 
and the other moral virtues." One virtue, Friendship, Aristotle does 
treat "apart at great length." According to Jusserand its "admis- 
sion into [Aristotle's] treatise is justified, not to say excused, on the 
plea that it is either a virtue or related to virtue, and that it is most 
necessary in life."^ But it could hardly need a better justification. 

Finally Jusserand points out: "Some, admitted into the class 
at one part of the work, are described elsewhere as doubtfully belong- 
ing to it There is also a chapter on Shame (atScbs, Lat. 

verecundia), though 'it is not correct to call it a virtue.' But 
'neither is Self-control,' adds Aristotle in the same chapter."' Thus 
Jusserand makes much of showing that Aristotle is sometimes uncer- 
tain whether a given one of his desirable means is a virtue or not — 
that is, whether or not it comes under a technical definition of virtue. 
And then, strangely enough, he expects Spenser to be severely 
technical when his master has not been. But Aristotle tells us 
plainly in Book I, chap, i, of his Nicomachean Ethics, and again in 
Book II, chap, ii, that in a discussion on ethics scientific] exactitude 
is impossible. He answers Jusserand's objections some centuries 

> Mod. Phil.. III. 374-75. 
« Ibid., p. 374. 
*Ibid., pp. 374-75. 



12 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

before they were made. He says: "An educated person will expect 
accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject 
allows."^ Jusserand overlooks the important fact that both Aristotle 
and Spenser are eminently practical in their aims. ,In Book II, 
chap, ii, Aristotle says: "Our present study is not, like other studies, 
purely speculative in its intention; for the object of our inquiry is 
not to know the nature of virtue but to become ourselves virtuous, 
as that is the sole benefit which it conveys." Spenser's statement 
to Raleigh of the object he had in writing the Faerie Queene shows 
the practical nature of that work: "The general end therefore of all 
the book is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and 
gentle discipline."^ With such a purpose, is it likely that Spenser 
would stop to quibble over whether such a quality as Temperance, 
for example, does or does not come under a technical definition of 
virtue ? What would his gentleman be without it ? Is it not reason- 
able that, in attempting to follow Aristotle, Spenser would take all 
of Aristotle's desirable means or good qualities? Whether certain 
of them come under a technical definition of virtue or not, they are 
virtues in any practical sense. And Aristotle himself regarded them 
as such, as is shown by the fact that he discussed them as virtues. 
Besides, they are absolutely necessary to a system which is to 
"fashion a gentleman or noble person" not only in "vertuous," but 
also in "gentle," discipline. 

This brings us to a very simple explanation of how Spenser got 
his number of virtues. He simply took all of Aristotle's desirable 
means, or qualities essential to the good man. Now Aristotle dis- 
cussed, all told, thirteen good qualities, or desirable means, as Jusse- 
rand himself observes. One of these, as Jusserand also observes, is 
Magnificence. Magnificence, as we saw, Spenser gives to Arthur, 
leaving exactly twelve others. Clearly, if one of Aristotle's virtues 
contains all the others, his virtues might properly be divided into 
"the twelve" and the one which includes the twelve. 

So much for the number of Spenser's and Aristotle's virtues. 
We come now to Jusserand's argument that "the nature of the 
virtues considered by Spenser matches the Aristotelian selection 

» N. Eth.. I. i. 

» Spenser's Letter to Sir Walter Raleigh, included in all editions of the Faerie Queene. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 13 

scarcely better than their number"' — a proposition which to Jusse- 
rand means that the two do not match at all. 

Before discussing the nature of Spenser's virtues, it will be neces- 
sary to clear the ground somewhat by saying a word about how the 
Faerie Queene is to be interpreted. There is a notion that Spenser's 
episodes are unimportant. For example, Jusserand disposes of the 
lesson of one of Spenser's great cantos by saying, "It is only inci- 
dentally dwelt upon, forming the episode of Guyon's visit to Medina, 
Bk. II, c. 2."^ And in this attitude toward the episodes Jusserand 
is by no means alone. Any notion that whatever is not a part of 
Spenser's main plot can have little to do with his meaning is based 
upon a misconception of the fundamental^ structure of Spenser's 
great poem. An episode filhng one of Spenser's cantos — a great 
poem in itself — such as the one in which Guyon is taken by his PalmeJ 
(Reason or Prudence) to the house of Medina (the Mean), where the 
Knight of Temperance learns the fundamental conception of true 
Temperance, cannot be considered unimportant. Such an episode 
may be "only incidental" to some of the points named in Spenser's 
letter to Raleigh, in which the author undertakes to state the "gen- 
eral intention" and to give something of the plot and plan of more 
than half a miUion words, and to propose and name the contents of 
a second poem, which would probably' have contained another half 
million words, all in a four-page letter — a summary which disposes 
of the whole of the Book on Temperance in six lines. But in Spenser's 
development of any given virtue, such an episode is of very great 
importance. 

It is mainly by means of the episodes that Spenser's discussion 
of the virtues is carried on. This fact will become clear as we pro- 
ceed. We may note here, however, Spenser's direct testimony that 
his episodes are organic. In the Book on Courtesy, at the end of a 
three-canto episode showing CaUdore's Courtesy among the lowly, 
Spenser makes it unmistakably clear that each episode in the Faerie 

> Mod. Phil., in. Z75. 

» Ibid., p. 381, and note. 

• It will be observed that Spenser does not say how many Books will be in the second 
part: he speaks only of " these first twelve bookes" and of " the other part." Nor does 
he give the number of the political virtues. Aristotle gives nowhere a list of the political 
virtues. 



14 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Queene represents some phase of the virtue under discussion; that 
the author "never is astray."^ Again, in the Book on Justice, in 
introducing the account of the spousal of Florimel, Spenser assures 
us that he is admitting to the poem nothing save what "with this 
present treatise doth agree, True vertue to advance."^ And the 
episode turns out to be a study in just distribution of honors, which 
according to Aristotle is the essence of Justice.* 

Moreover, Spenser does not intend that his readers shall mis- 
understand him. "By certaine signes here set in sundry place,"* he 
aims to see to it that the reader "never is astray." And among the 
most helpful of these "signes" are the very illuminating comments 
of the author, oftenest at the beginning, but sometimes in the middle 
of a canto.^ No one will need to be reminded of the importance of 
Spenser's arguments to the cantos and his proems to the books. 
Sometimes a few lines spoken by one of the characters throw great 
light on the allegory of the poem.® Professor Greene has truly 
remarked, "Only a man of abundant leisure can read the [Faerie 
Queene] as Spenser would have it read."' To get the meanmg, one 
must watch not only the enveloping plot and the episodes, but also 
every comment, every speech, every line, every word, and, frequently, 
in the case of proper names, every syllable. He must read the poem 
intensively — ^minutely : 

ne let him then admire, 
But yield his sence to be too blunt and bace, 
That no'te without an hound fine footing trace.* 

So much for the manner in which Spenser is to be interpreted. 
Let us now examine, in the case of each of the six virtues developed 
by Spenser, Jusserand's argument that Spenser's and Aristotle's 
virtues are unlike in nature. 

>VI.xii, 1-2. Cf. I.vii.50: Il.xii. 1; III.vi.52: VI.iii.25: Vl.ix. 1. 
« V, iii. 3. 

» With this canto of Spenser's Book on Justice, cf. N. Eth.. V. ii. and V, iv. and 
Politics, II. vii. With Braggadocchio cf . AchiUes' Coward. Politics, II. vii. 

* Book II, Proem, stanza 4. 

8 See I, viii. 1, or I. x, 1. Other examples will be pointed out later. 

• Sfee. for example. I. viii. 49. 

» H. L. Greene, "Allegory in Spenser, Bunyan, and Swift," Pub. Mod. Lang. Aaaoe., 
IV (1889), 181. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEEN E" 15 

Concerning the subject of Spenser's first Book, Jusserand says: 
"Holiness is certainly not borrowed from Aristotle's series of moral 
virtues."^ This is mere assertion, not argument. Possibly an argu- 
ment is thought to lie in a supposed inconsistency between "holi- 
ness" and "moral virtues"; but if so, it should be remembered that 
Spenser certainly classed holiness as a moral virtue, as is shown not 
only by the letter to Raleigh but also by the "XII. Morall vertues" 
of the title-page of the Faerie Queene. 

Again, Jusserand says that Spenser's reference to the twelve 
moral virtues of Aristotle was "a mere afterthought, probably, 
imagined after part of the poem had been written ; for Spenser begins 
with the virtue of HoUness, conspicuously absent as we saw from 
Aristotle's enumeration," etc.'^ Surely it is incredible that Spenser 
should contemplate a great epic for years (see Spenser's letter to 
Harvey under date of 1580) and finally write the forty-five thousand 
words of the Book on HoKness without even a general notion of the 
plot and purpose of his poem. Besides, the fact that the machinery 
of the court of Gloriana and of the quests is introduced at the very- 
beginning of Book P indicates that the plan of the letter to Raleigh 
was not an "afterthought." But even if we were to admit that the 
reference to Aristotle was an afterthought, conceived after the first 
Book was written, it would have to fit, at least approximately. 
And Book I, Holiness, was one of the three which accompanied the 
letter to Raleigh. How could Spenser say that each of the twelve 
Books of the Faerie Queene would contain one of Aristotle's twelve 
moral virtues, "of which these three bookes contayn three,"* when 
the first of the three had nothing whatever to do with Aristotle? 
Could he expect to deceive Raleigh, Sidney, EUzabeth, and the rest 
of the briUiant circle for whom he wrote ? 

Obviously Jusserand misunderstands, or has forgotten, the mean- 
ing of Aristotle's virtue of Highmindedness, or Magnanimity; for 
he sees in it only "a kind of ornament applicable to all the virtues."^ 
It is well known that this virtue represents Aristotle's conception of 

> Mod. Phil.. III. 376. 

*Ibid.. p. 381. 

* I, i. See also canto vii, stanza 46. 

< Letter to Raleigh. 

' Mod. Phil.. Ill, 382. 



16 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

absolute moral perfection. "The highminded man," says Aristotle, 
"seems to be one who thinks himself worthy of great things, and who 
is worthy of them. For he who thinks himself worthy of great things 
without being so is foolish, and no virtuous person is foolish orabsurd." 
"There will be one particular object of his interest .... honor." 
" Highmindedness, then, has to do with honor on a great scale." 
"The highminded man, as being worthy of the highest things, will 
be in the highest degree good." " It seems that the highminded man 
possesses such greatness as belongs to every virtue." "It seems that 
Highmindedness is, as it were, the crown of the virtues, as it enhances 
them and cannot exist apart from them." Finally, the following 
sentence shows Aristotle's exalted conception of Highmindedness: 
"He [the highminded man] will be only moderately pleased at great 
honors conferred upon him by virtuous people, as feeling that he 
obtains what is naturally his due or even less than his due; for it would 
be impossible to devise an honor that should be proportionate to 
perfect virtue."^ 

But is the Knight of Holiness Aristotle's highminded man? 
Some change in the conception of the Red Cross Knight was, of 
course, necessary on account of the fact that he was a Christian hero. 
So far as possible, however, Spenser has made him conform to 
Aristotle's conception of Highmindedness. First, he is characterized 
by a high opinion of himself. For proof of his amazing self-confidence 
we have not only Spenser's letter to Raleigh, but also the Faerie 
Queene itself. "A tall clownishe younge man" who has never worn 
armor,^ he enters the court of great Gloriana, 

Where noblest knights were to be found on earth,' 
and to the great wonder of the Queen and the disappointment and 
mortification of Una, whom he proposes to help, demands the greatest 
of all quests, the establishment of Truth — true Christianity — and the 
defeat of Error and the Devil, a quest so difficult that, although great 
knights from all over the world have tried it, none has been able to 
fulfil it.* Assuredly he thinks himself worthy of great things. But 
he not only thinks himself worthy; he is worthy — as is abundantly 
proved, not alone by his ability to wear the Christian armor, which 

« For Aristotle's discussion of Highmindedness see Nicomachean Ethics, IV, vii ff. 
» Letter to Raleigh, and f.Q.. 1. 1,1. »I,m, 28. * I. vii, 45. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEEN E" 17 

is the test,* nor by Una's later testimony concerning his great work,^ 
but also by his final triumph over all enemies including the Dragon 
of Evil.' In the second place, his chief thought is the winning of 
great earthly honor. His "noble heart" is "with child of glorious 
great intent" and 

Can never rest, untill it forth have brought 
Th' eternall brood of gloria excellent.* 

"All for prayse and honour he did fight."* From first to last the 
Knight of Holiness is in pursuit of honor. He has come to Faerie 
Court in the first place to seek for fame : 

prickt with courage, and thy forces pryde, 
To Faery court thou cam'st to seeke for fame.* 

Upon our first introduction to him, at the beginning of the Faerie 
Queene, we are told : 

Upon a great adventure he was bond, 
That greatest Gloriana to him gave, 
That greatest Glorious Queene of Faerie lond, 
To winne him worship, and her grace to have, 
Which of all earthly things he most did crave.'' 

And when he appears in the third Book, after he has attained perfect 
HoUness, his character in this respect is unchanged: 

Then he forth on his journey did proceede, 
To seeke adventures, which mote him befall. 
And win him worship through his warlike deed, 
Which alwayes of his paines he made the chiefest meed.' 

Nor does the Red Cross Knight seek merely great honor; he seeks 
the greatest of all earthly honor. Una tells him that his fight with 
the Dragon of Evil 

shall ye evermore renowmed make, 
Above all knights on earth, that batteiU undertake.^ 

» Letter to Raleigh. « I. v. 1. 

» I. vii. 47-49. • I. v. 7. 

» I. 3d. • I. X, 66. 

' I, i, 3. Italics in quotations from Spenser are all mine. I quote from Smith and 
De Selincourt's Poetical Works of Spenser, Oxford, 1912, but I have disregarded the 
italicization of proper names and followed modem usage in regard to u, r, and ;'. 

» III. iv. 4. 

• I. xi. 2. 



18 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

And Heavenly Comtemplation has already told him what this great 
honor is to be. The knight is to be Saint George, famous throughout 
Europe as a military saint, and the patron saint of England : 
For thou emongst those Saints, whom thou doest see, 
Shalt be a Saint, and thine owne nations frend 
And Patrone: thou Saint George shalt called bee. 
Saint George of mery England, the signe of victoree.^ 

Finally, that the Red Cross Knight's Highmindedness may be com- 
plete and convincing in Spenser's and Aristotle's^ view, Heavenly 
Contemplation explains that the knight is of high birth — 
thou springst from ancient race 
Of Saxon kings.* 

And we know that it is by deliberate plan, not by accident, that 
Spenser makes the Red Cross Knight's one great passion love of 
honor. Even Heavenly Contemplation sanctions the knight's pur- 
suit of earthly fame.* And the poet, in his own person — 

That I this man of God his godly armes may blaze* — 
prays aid of 

The Nourse of time, and everlasting fame 

That warlike hands ennoblest with immortall name.^ 

The moral perfection which the knight attains is, no doubt, to be 

expected : 

from the first unto the last degree. 
His mortall life he learned had to frame 
In holy righteousnesse, without rebuke or blame.^ 

It is not to be overlooked that all of Spenser's great knights are 
characterized by Highmindedness, as they are by all of the other 
moral virtues. This is in accordance with Aristotle's tendency to 
make any given virtue include all the others, and his teaching that 
"Neither greatness nor highmindedness is possible without complete 
virtue."^ But although, on account of this close relation between 
the virtues, such great knights as Guyon and Artegall are character- 
ized by Highmindedness, none of Spenser's knights, except possibly 

»I, X. 61. 

2 This statement is warranted not only by Aristotle's and Spenser's strong feeling 
of aristocracy, but also by Aristotle's discussion of Highmindedness in N. Eth., IV, viii. 
«I, X, 65. •!, xi. 5. 

« I, X, 59. 60, and 62. ' I, x, 45. 

SI, xi. 7. *N. Eth., TV. viii. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 19 

the all-perfect Arthur, can compare in Highmindedness with the 
Knight of Holiness. That especial emphasis should be laid on 
Arthur's Highmindedness would naturally result not only from the 
close relation between the virtues, but also from Arthur's moral 
perfection. But it is in Book I, where Arthur tells his dream of 
glory, that we are most impressed with his Highmindedness. And 
according to Spenser's plan in the letter to Raleigh, Arthur must, in 
the Book on Holiness, represent the same virtue as the Knight of 
Holiness: "In the whole course I mention the deedes of Arthure 
applyable to that vertue, which I write of in that booke." Con- 
sequently, if Arthur represents Highmindedness in Book I, so 
must the Knight of the Red Cross. Thus it is clear that the Knight 
of Holiness exempUfies Aristotle's virtue of Highmindedness. Nor 
was Spenser doing anything unusual in thus combining pagan and 
sacred writings. He was only doing what many divines did both 
before and after him. Moreover, he was only doing what he himself 
did again and again in the Faerie Queene, sometimes in a rather sur- 
prising fashion. For example, in II, xii, 52, he compares Acrasia's 
Bower, falsely named the "Bowre of blis," not only to "Parnasse" 
and Mount Ida, but also to the Garden of Eden, the comparison 
being unfavorable even to Eden. Again, the marriage rites of Una 
and the Ejiight of Holiness, described in I, xii, are pagan, not Chris- 
tian. ^ There is nothing surprising, however, in his combining 
Aristotle's Highmindedness with Christianity; for the combination 
is simply moral perfection (represented by the Knight of Holiness) 
married to Christian truth (Una). 

I have discussed the case of Holiness at considerable length 
because it is the only one which is in any way doubtful. In Books 
1 1- VI it is certain that Spenser is consciously and deliberately 
following Aristotle. 

The subject of Spenser's second Book is Temperance. Jusserand 
has to admit that " [Spenser's virtue of] Temperance truly and plainly 
corresponds to one of Aristotle's [virtues]. "^ Aristotle outlines 
Temperance briefly in the Nicomachean Ethics, II, vii, discusses it at 
some length in III, xiii-xv, and continues the discussion throughout 

« See I. xii. 37. 

« Mod. Phil.. III. 376. 



20 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

most of Book VII. Spenser, in his Book on Temperance, draws upon 
all three discussions. 

Concerning the virtue of Spenser's third Book, Jusserand says: 
"Chastity may be held to have been [one of Aristotle's virtues], if we 
give the word the sense of 'shame' (verecundia) , and neglect the fact 
that Aristotle, while studying it, declares that this 'shame' is not a 
virtue."^ That both Spenser and Aristotle were interested in prac- 
tical morality, not in whether such qualities as Temperance and 
Chastity are technically virtues, we have already seen. Although 
Aristotle tends to make this virtue of Shame, or Modesty, all- 
inclusive, just as he tends to make all the others, his discussion of it 
in the Nicomachean Ethics^ and in the Rhetoric^ leaves unquestionable 
the fact that he means it particularly to apply to sex morality. It is 
hardly necessary to state that in his Book on Chastity Spenser is 
discussing sex morality from the standpoint of Shame, or Modesty, 
on the one hand, and Shamelessness, on the other.* It should be 
added that sex morality is also an important part of Aristotle's dis- 
cussion of Temperance, including Licentiousness and Incontinence. 
Aristotelian Temperance, in the strict or particular sense, applies to 
"meats" and "drinks" and "what are called the pleasures of love."^ 
Aristotelian Shame, or Modesty, in the strict sense, applies, of course, 
to the last of these. Spenser, in his Book on Chastity, drew not 
only upon Aristotle's discussion of Shame, or Modesty, but also upon 
that part of his discussion of Temperance and Incontinence which 
deals with sex morality. 

Concerning the subjects of Spenser's fourth and fifth Books, 
Jusserand says: "The reader knows what the case is with Friendship 
and Justice."® I believe he does. 

Finally, concerning Courtesy, the subject of Spenser's sixth Book, 
Jusserand says: "Courtesy may be held to correspond, if to any- 
thing, to Aristotle's friendliness, but not without a considerable 

> Mod. Phil., III. 376. 
» N. Eth., II. vii; IV, xv. 
' Rhetoric, II, vi, xii. and xiii, 

♦ See, for example, III, i, 48. See also. III, i. 50; III, ii, 40-41; III, iv, 45; III, v. 
55; III, vii, 49; III,viii,32; and III, xii, 24. 
' N. Eth., Ill, xiii. 
« Mod. Phil.. III. 376. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 21 

extension and modernization of the word Aristotle's descrip- 
tion of friendliness best suits, however, without matching it exactly, 
the modern notion of courtesy."^ The New English Dictionary 
reveals nothing inconsistent in Spenser's discussing under the name 
of Courtesy the virtue which Aristotle says is most like Friendliness. 
But what really counts, a comparison of Spenser's Book on Courtesy 
with this Near-FriendUness, shows that the two really do match. 
The sphere of Aristotle's Near-Friendliness is "human society, with 
its common life and association in words and deeds." The virtue 
is a mean between flattery, obsequiousness, complaisance, on the one 
hand, and surliness, disagreeableness, contentiousness, on the other. 
Aristotle says: "It most resembles Friendhness; for the person 
in whom it exists answers to our idea of a virtuous friend, except 

that friendliness includes affection as well He will so 

act alike to strangers and acquaintances," etc.^ Thus Aristotle's 
Near-Friendliness is a kind of Golden Rule : In your association with 
others, including strangers, speak to them and act toward them as a 
virtuous friend would do. 

Spenser's virtue of Courtesy matches this Aristotelian ideal 
exactly. It allows neither flattery, on the one hand, nor conten- 
tiousness, on the other.' It consists in acting toward others as a 
virtuous friend would act. It should be remembered, however, that 
with both Aristotle and Spenser friendship includes love; and also 
that, in accordance with Aristotle's and Spenser's tendency to make 
any given virtue include all the others. Courtesy and Discourtesy 
will include other virtues and vices. 

For seldome yet did living creature see, 
That curtesie and manhood ever disagree.* 

That the virtue of Spenser's sixth Book does consist in acting toward 
others as a true friend would act is shown by the characters and the 
episodes. Calidore, Tristram, Calepine, Prince Arthur, and others 
represent Courtesy, or Friendliness. Maleffort, Crudor, and Briana, 
who maltreat strangers (c. i.) ; the "proud discourteous knight" whom 
Tristram slays (c. ii); the contemptible Sir Turpine, who will not 
» Ibid. 

« N. Eth., IV, xii. 

• See, for example, Spenser's exposition of Calidore's Courtesy in VI, i, 2-3. 

* VI. iii. 40. 



22 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

give lodging to Calepine and his wounded lady, or help the wounded 
woman over the ford, and who even attacks the defenseless knight 
(c. iii, vi, viii) ; Mirabella, who delights in the sufferings of her lovers 
(c. vii); the "salvage nation," which preys upon strangers (c. viii, 
stanzas 35 ff.); and the "theeves" who lead Pastorell into captivity 
(c. ix, xi) — these are some of the examples of Unfriendliness, of not 
acting toward others as a virtuous friend would act. And, finally, 
the Blatant Beast is not Slander, as it is sometimes named, nor yet 
the Puritans, as it is oftenest named. It is the Spirit of Unfriendli- 
ness;^ it is Malice, Malevolence, Envy, Despite, Slander, Conten- 
tiousness, and is represented in one place,^ no doubt, by the most 
contentious element among the Puritans. The Blatant Beast, like 
Duessa, 

could d'on so manie shapes in sight, 
As ever could cameleon colours new.' 

Besides, Spenser more than once shows by the speeches of his char- 
acters, combined with the plot, that he is keeping before him Aris- 
totle's ideal of acting toward others as a true friend would act. For 
example, in VI, iii, 15, Aldine is talking to Sir Calidore, the Knight 
of Courtesy. The two are strangers, having seen each other but 
once before. We are told: 

In th'end his [Calidore's] kyudly courtesie to prove. 

He [Aldine] him by all the bands of love besought, 

And as it mote a faithfull friend behove, 

To safeconduct his love, and not for ought 

To leave, till to her fathers house he had her brought. 

After attempting to show that the virtues of Spenser's six* Books 
are not the ones discussed by Aristotle, Jusserand contends that 

« With V, xii, 28-43, and VI, i, 7-10, in which passages the Blatant Beast is identified 
with Envy and Detraction, the latter including Malevolence, and with VI, v, 12-22, in 
which the Blatant Beast is identified with Malice, Deceit, and Detraction, compare the 
author's comment, or literal exposition of Discourtesy, in VI, vii, 1-2. 

2 See VI, xii, 22-41; but note in VI, xii, 22 and 23, that the Blatant Beast has gone 
"through every place" and "through all estates," all ranks of life, before he comes to the 
"Clergy." 

« IV. i. 18. 

* M. Jusserand holds that the fragment called Book VII is not a part of the F.Q. 
Therefore, he does not discuss it. My discussion of it will be found in the next section 
of this thesis. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 23 

Spenser's and Aristotle's virtues are unlike in that Aristotle treats 
all his virtues as means between extremes, even straining absurdly 
to do so, whereas Spenser treats only one of his, Temperance, as a 
mean, and it " only incidentally."^ He admits that, " Either through 
direct or indirect borrowings, [Spenser] took from [Aristotle] his 
notion of the middle or virtuous state, standing between two faulty 
extremes." But he adds, "He did not try, as Aristotle did, to 
apply this theory to every virtue. It is only incidentally dwelt upon, 
forming the episode of Guyon's visit to Medina, Book II, c. 2."^ 
This point is important; for Jusserand's criticism means that 
Spenser ignored, almost completely, Aristotle's fundamental con- 
ception of what a virtue is — ignored what is the most important and 
characteristic thing about Aristotle's moral philosophy. Let us see 
if he did. 

Expressed in terms of method, Aristotle's moral philosophy is 
essentially this: (1) He develops a virtue by showing its opposites, 
and by discussing various phases of the virtue and of its opposites.' 
He treats a virtue as a mean between two extremes;* but he dis- 
cusses various phases of the mean and of its extremes, and he tends 
to make any given virtue include all the others;^ so that his virtues 
become a kind of center surrounded by many opposites.® (2) He 
gives great emphasis to what he calls "the opposite" of a virtue, and 
says less, and in some cases almost nothing, about the other extreme, 
for his mean is not arithmetical ; one who aims at the mean, he says, 
must, like Ulysses, keep farthest from Charybdis, the more danger- 
ous of the two extremes.^ And (3) he makes Reason the determiner 
of the right course in the case of each of the moral virtues.* 

Such is the essence of Aristotle's moral philosophy. If, as Jusse- 
rand contends, Spenser ignores one of these principles, he is certainly 
not following Aristotle. If, as I shall undertake to prove, he applies 

» Mod. Phil., III. 374, 381, and note. 

"Ibid., 381, and note. 

» See N. Eth., Ill, ix ff. ; IV: and V. See also II. vii. 

« See his definition of virtue "regarded in its essence or theoretical conception," 
N. Eth.. II, vi. See also II, viii. 

» See his explanation of his definition of virtue, N. Eth., VI, especially chaps, i and 
xiii. 

• See N. Eth.. II. v. and II. ix. 

' See N. Eth., II, ix. » Ibid., II, vi. 



24 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

all of these principles in his treatment of the virtues, he certainly 
does follow Aristotle, at least in essentials. 

Spenser certainly develops the virtue of Holiness by showing its 
opposites, and by presenting various phases of the virtue ?nd of its 
opposites. He represents Holiness by the Knight of Holiness (High- 
mindedness, moral perfection), Una (Christian Truth), Faith, Hope, 
and Charity, Heavenly Contemplation, and so on ; and around these 
he groups Paganism, or Infidelity, "Blind Devotion"^ (Corceca), Mo- 
nastic Superstition (Abessa), "Hypocrise"^ (Archimago), Falsehood 
(Duessa, "faire Falsehood"^), False Pride or Conceit (Orgoglio and 
Lucifera), the Seven Deadly Sins and all the other vices. Error (the 
Dragon of Error in the first canto), and Satan (in Lucif era's train, 
and the Dragon of Evil in canto xi). 

Moreover, he represents the virtue as a mean between extremes 
and emphasizes one extreme. Paganism, represented by the Paynim 
brethren Sansfoy (UnbeUef), Sansjoy (Joylessness), and Sansloy 
(Lawlessness), is certainly one extreme in regard to Holiness. The 
opposite extreme is represented by Corceca ("Blind Devotion"), 
Abessa (Monastic Superstition), and the Satyrs who worship even 
Una's ass. Corceca is an ignorant, blind old woman who says 
thirty-six hundred prayers every day. She dares not stop mumbling 
her prayers. Abessa is her daughter. Again, the Knight of Holi- 
ness is a mean between sinful "joyaunce" and joyless faith and 
abstinence, though it costs him hard fighting to keep to this mean. 
After he has slain the Paynim Sansfoy (canto ii), he successfully 
resists (canto iv) the temptation to join with Duessa in the "joy- 
aunce" of the gay party composed of the Seven Deadly Sins. But 
immediately after he has resisted the joyance of sin, he is attacked 
by the Paynim Sansjoy, who proposes to cancel his victory over 
Sansfoy by taking away the shield which is the emblem of his victory.* 
He is least fortified on the side of Joylessness; we are told upon our 
first introduction to him that " of his cheere [he] did seeme too solemne 
sad."^ Accordingly, the battle which ensues with Sansjoy is one of 



« I, ill, Arg. i I, i, Arg. 3 1, u, Arg. 

4 For the joyfulness of Faith see Spenser's description of Faith (Fidelia) in canto x, 
especially stanzas 12-14. 
'1.1.2. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEEN E" 25 

the hardest of his career.^ Once more the Knight of Holiness is, as 
we have already seen, Aristotle's mean of Highmindedness. He 
thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them; he 
neither overestimates nor underestimates his own worth — he is 
neither conceited nor meanminded. Arthur also represents this 
mean of Highmindedness. He thinks himself worthy of great honor, 
and is worthy of it. He aspires to the hand of great Gloriana (Glory) , 
but we know, not only from his moral perfection, but also from the 
direct testimony of Una and the Knight of Holiness, that he is 
worthy of her.'' According to Aristotle, the worst case of Mean- 
mindedness, one of the two extremes in regard to Highmindedness 
is the man of great worth who underestimates his own deserts — 
cares too little for honor. Sir Satyrane, in a measure, illustrates this 
extreme. We feel that he is capable of as great things as Guyon or 
Calidore. Yet he disappoints us; he does nothing supremely great. 
Although he is possessed of great worth and wins fame — "through 
all Faery lond his famous worth was blown"' — he cares nothing for 
great honor. He is not among those who seek quests from great 
Gloriana, 

That glorie does to them for guerdon graunt.* 

To represent Conceit, the other main extreme in regard to High- 
mindedness, two characters are drawn, one masculine and one 
feminine. Orgoglio (Ital. orgoglio, pride; cf. Gk. dpydu), though 
born of dirt and wind, and fostered by Ignaro (Ignorance), thinks 
himself very great. But when he is slain by the Knight of Holiness, 
his huge trunk collapses like a punctured bladder, showing that he 
is puffed up with conceit. Lucifera (the sinful mistress of the " house 
of Pryde"*) is excessively proud and supercilious, though she is only 
the daughter of "Griesly Pluto" and the "Queene of Hell" and is 
thoroughly unworthy of honor. She includes all the Seven Deadly 
Sins, as Highmindedness includes all the virtues. Duessa also serves 
to represent Conceit,* though her main business is to represent False- 
hood; she is very proud of her beauty and finery, but when stripped 

> For the importance which Spenser attaches to this battle against joylessness, see 
the author's comments in canto v. stanza 1. 

2 1, ix. 16, 17. ' I. vi. 29. * I, X. 59. ' I. iv, Arg. 

• Note in I. iv, 37. that Duessa rides next to Lucifera. 



26 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

of false show, she proves to be only a filthy old hag. Clearly Spenser's 
emphasis is on the extreme of Conceit or False Pride. 

Finally, Spenser certainly makes Reason the determiner of the 
mean for the virtue of Holiness. In canto ii the arch-deceiver 
Archimago makes the Knight of Holiness believe that his lady, Una, 
has stained her honor. Enraged, the Knight deserts Una, for whom 
he has undertaken to slay the Dragon of Evil, and rides off alone. 
He has ceased to be governed by Reason. We are told : 

The eye of [his] reason was with rage yblent.^ 

Later we see again that he is guided not by Reason, but by 'will': 

Will was his guide, and griefe led him astray.^ 

This is the beginning of all his troubles. He now misses the mean of 
Highmindedness. After a narrow escape from the House of Pride 
with its vices and pitiable victims, he is captured by Orgoglio (False 
Pride, Conceit) and languishes in his prison until rescued by Arthur 
(Highmindedness). Again, in canto vii, Arthur meets the deserted 
Una. In persuading her to unfold her grief, he advises her that 
" flesh may empaire .... but reason can repaire."* And " his goodly 
reason"* wins. Thus we see that both Una and the Knight of Holi- 
ness must be governed by Reason. But so must Arthur. In canto 
ix, in which Arthur tells of the vision which caused him to fall in love 
with Gloriana, and of his pursuit of Glory, Arthur says: 

But me had warnd old Timons wise behest, 
Those creeping flames by reason to subdew, etc.^ 

Here again Reason is the determiner of the mean in regard to High- 
mindedness, or love of honor. Finally, even the Paynim Sansfoy 
apologizes for forgetting "the raines to hold of reasons rule."^ 

We come now to Temperance. Everyone knows that Spenser 
develops this virtue and the virtues of all his other Books by showing 
their opposites and by presenting various phases of the virtue and 
of its opposites, and that he tends to make any given virtue all- 
inclusive. From the book of any one of Spenser's virtues a good case 
could be made out for all the moral virtues. But Spenser not only 

« stanza 5. » Stanza 12. 3 stanza 41. * Stanza 42. ' Stanza 9. « I, iv, 41 . 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 27 

presents various phases of Temperance ; he treats the same phases of 
Temperance that Aristotle treats. For example, outside of Temper- 
ance and Incontinence in the strict sense, the kinds of intemperance 
most emphasized by Aristotle are incontinence in regard to angry- 
passion, incontinence in regard to honor, and incontinence in regard 
to wealth or gain. Aristotle specially and repeatedly mentions 
these as things in regard to which men may be incontinent in the 
broad sense. For instance, he says: "Men are called incontinent 
in respect of angry passion, honor, and gain."^ Now these are the 
very kinds of intemperance which, outside of intemperance in the 
strict sense, Spenser presents most strongly. Angry passion Spenser 
exemplifies in Furor; in Phedon, who, "chawing vengeance,"^ mur- 
ders his sweetheart and his bosom friend, and is trying to murder his 
sweetheart's maid when he falls into the hands 'of Furor; and in 
Pyrochles, who "Furors chayne unbinds."' Incontinence in respect 
of honor Spenser exemplifies in " Vaine Braggadocchio."* He is one 
of Aristotle's "Conceited people," who, says Aristotle, "are foolish 
and ignorant of themselves and make themselves conspicuous by 

being so They get themselves up in fine dresses, and pose 

for effect, and so on, and wish their good fortune to be known to all 
the world, and talk about themselves as if that were the road to 
honor. "^ Braggadocchio represents Conceit, or desire of honor by 
one who is unworthy of it, one of the opposites of Highmindedness, 
or right love of honor on a great scale. Again, one of the greatest of 
the temptations in Spenser's Cave of Mammon is Ambition, one of 
Aristotle's extremes in regard to ordinary honors. Incontinence in 
regard to wealth or gain is, of course, powerfully presented in Mam- 
mon, who tempts the Knight of Temperance in canto vii. 

But, in addition to treating it as a kind of center surrounded by 
opposites, Spenser treats Temperance as a mean between extremes, 
emphasizes one extreme in particular, and makes Reason the deter- 
miner of the mean. In the first canto of his Book on Temperance 
he works out Aristotle's mean concerning Temperance. Although 
Aristotle holds that all the virtues are concerned with pleasure and 
pain, he gives peculiar emphasis to the relation of Temperance to 

» N. Elh.. VII, u. » II, iv, 29. ' II, v, Arg. * II, iii. Arg. ' N. Eth.. IV, ix. 



28 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

pleasure and pain in his definition of the virtue. He says: "In 
respect of pleasures and pains, although not indeed of all pleasures 
and pains, and to a less extent in respect of pains than of pleasures, 
the mean state is Temperance."^ Again, in connection with Incon- 
tinence, Aristotle gives an important place to the vice of Effeminacy. 
He says: 

Of the characters which have been described the one [incontinence] is 
rather a kind of effeminacy; the other is licentiousness. The opposite of 
the incontinent character is the continent, and of the effeminate the stead- 
fast; for steadfastness consists in holding out against pain, and continence 
in overcoming pleasure, and it is one thing to hold out, and another to over- 
come, as it is one thing to escape being beaten and another to win a victory. 
.... If a person gives way where people generally resist and are capable 
of resisting, he deserves to be called effeminate It is only unpardon- 
able where a person is mastered by things against which most people succeed 
in holding out, and is impotent to struggle against them, unless his impotence 
be due to hereditary constitution or to disease, as effeminacy is hereditary 
in the kings of Scythia, or as woman is naturally weaker than a man. 

And he continues: "It is people of a quick and atrabilious temper 
whose incontinence is particularly apt to take the form of impetu- 
osity; for the rapidity or the violence of their feeling prevents them 
from waiting for the guidance of reason."^ Finally, Aristotle con- 
demns suicide as Effeminacy: "For it is effeminacy to fly from 
troubles, nor does the suicide face death because it is noble, but 
because it is a refuge from evil."^ In canto i of Spenser's Book 
on Temperance we have the story of Mordant and Amavia. Acrasia 
(Intemperance), a beautiful but wicked enchantress, entices Sir 
Mordant away from his wife and finally poisons him; and the wife, 
in a fit of grief, commits suicide. Sir Guyon (the Knight of Tem- 
perance) and his Palmer (Reason or Prudence), having learned the 
story from the expiring wife, stand looking at the two dead bodies. 
Sir Guyon, turning to his Palmer, says: 

Old Syre 
Behold the image of mortalitie. 
And feeble nature cloth'd with fleshly tyre. 
When raging passion with fierce tyrannic, 
Robs reason of her due regalitie, 

I N. Eih., II. vii. « Ihid., VII. viii. > Ibid., III. xi. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 29 

And makes it servant to her basest pd,rt: 
The strong it weakens with infirmitie, 
And with bold furie armes the weakest hart; 
The strong through pleasure soonest falles, the 
weake through smart. 

Then Sir Guyon's Palmer (Reason) replies : 

But temperance (said he) with golden squire 
Betwixt them both can measure out a meane, 
Neither to melt in pleasures whot desire, 
Nor fry in hartlesse griefe and dolefull teene. 
Thrise happie man, who fares them both atweene} 

Thus the incontinent Sir Mordant and the efifeminate Amavia meet 
disaster because they fail to take the mean which Reason dictates in 
regard to "pleasure" and "smart." It will be noted that Spenser 
follows Aristotle even in such details as showing that greater strength 
is required to overcome pleasure than to resist pain. The importance 
which Spenser attaches to the suicide described in the episode is 
indicated by the name Amavia (Love of Life). Love of Life effemi- 
nately gives way to pain. The lesson of this canto cannot possibly 
be called "only incidental"; for Sir Guyon's relation to Mordant and 
Amavia is one of the larger elements of the plot, and one of the few 
discussed in Spenser's letter to Raleigh. It is the fate of Mordant 
and Amavia at the hands of Acrasia (Intemperance) which causes 
Guyon, the Knight of Temperance, to enter upon his quest to bind 
Acrasia, 

So much for canto i. In canto ii Spenser works out the mean in 
regard to Aristotelian Temperance in the strict, or particular, sense.'' 
Here, to quote Spenser's argument to the canto, Sir Guyon is shown 

the face of golden Meane. 
Her sisters two Extremities 
strive her to banish cleane. 

Reason is made the determiner of the mean.' 

What we have said of Spenser's treatment of Temperance as a 
mean between extremes is hardly more than a beginning of what 

« II, i, 57-58. 

' With the episode of Guyon's visit to Medina cf. N. Eth., II, vii; III, xiii; and VII, xl. 

' See especially II, ii, 38. See also stanzas 15 and 17. 



30 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

could be said if space permitted. See, for example, canto xii, which 
is a series of studies of the mean. The truth is that the whole Book 
is a study of the mean. Like Aristotle, Spenser puts the emphasis 
on the extreme of excess, not on that of deficiency. Again, we have 
mentioned only a few of the numerous instances in which Spenser 
makes Reason the determiner of the mean. See, for example, the 
author's comments in stanzas 1-2 of canto xi, in which Spenser lays 
down the general principle that Reason is the determiner of the mean 
in regard to Temperance. Another point is worth noting. Although 
Aristotle makes Reason the determiner of the mean in the case of 
each of the moral virtues, he gives peculiar emphasis to the rule of 
Reason in regard to Temperance. Accordingly, Spenser gives the 
greatest possible emphasis to the rule of reason in respect of Tem- 
perance. For example, Aristotle says in his discussion of Temper- 
ance : " As a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor 
(7rat6a7co76s) so ought the concupiscent element in man to live 
according to the reason."^ And Spenser gives his Knight of Temper- 
ance a tutor, the black Palmer, who continually accompanies, 
instructs, and directs him, and whom his "pupill"^ (Guy on) faithfully 
obeys. It is hardly necessary to add that Guyon's Palmer is Reason. 
If other proof than the allegory be needed that he is so, it may be 
found, for example, in II, i, 34; or in II, iv, 2; or in II, xii, 38. 

Passing to Chastity, Book III, we find that Spenser again follows 
Aristotle's method of treating a virtue and his conception of what a 
virtue is. Even Chastity is presented as a mean between extremes. 
Moreover, the extremes themselves are Aristotelian. 

There is a very close relation between Shame, or Chastity, and 
Temperance. Both Aristotle and Spenser make Temperance include 
sex morality. The extremes of Aristotelian Shame, or Modesty, in 
the strict sense, are Shamelessness and Licentiousness, on the one 
hand, and Bashfulness, lack of courteous bearing, on the other.' 
The extremes of Aristotelian Temperance, in the strict sense, are 
Licentiousness and Incontinence, on the one hand, and Insensibihty, 
or Asceticism, on the other.* Now it will be remembered that 

» N.Eth.,III,XY. 

« II, vlii, 7. 

» N. Eth., II, vii, and IV, xv; Rhetoric, II, vi, and II, xii-xiii. 

* N. Eth., II, vii; III, xiii-xv; VII, especially chap. xi. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 31 

Spenser in his discussion of Chastity draws not only upon Aristotle's 
discussion of Shame, or Modesty, but also upon that part of his dis- 
cussion of Temperance which has to do with sex morality. Accord- 
ingly he makes the extremes of his virtue of Chastity the Aristotelian 
extremes of Shamelessness, Licentiousness, and Incontinence, on the 
one hand, and Discourtesy and Insensibility, or Asceticism, or 
Celibacy, on the other. 

In the proem to the Book on Chastity, Spenser tells us that just 
as Gloriana represents the rule of Elizabeth, so Belphoebe represents 
"her rare chastity," and he makes the same point in his letter to 
Raleigh. In telUng how Belphoebe cared for her "flower" of 
"chastity and virtue virginal," he indicates the extremes: 

That dainty Rose, the daughter of her Morne, 
More deare then life she tendered, whose flowre 
The girlond of her honour did adorne: 
Ne suffred she the Middayes scorching powre, 
Ne the sharp Northeme wind thereon to showre, 
But lapped up her silken leaves most chaire. 
When so the fro ward skye began to lowre: 
But scone as calmed was the Christall aire. 
She did it faire dispred, and let to florish faire.* 

For the Courtesy of Belphoebe see, in III, v, 27-55,^ the story 
of her nursing the wounded Timias and of her treatment of him, a 
social inferior, when he falls in love with her. Belphoebe is praised 
because she can be chaste without running into the extreme of 
Discourtesy : 

In so great prayse of stedfast chastity, 

Nathlesse she was so curteous and kind, 

Tempred with grace and goodly modesty, 

That seemed those two vertues strove to find 

The higher place in her Heroick mind. 

To realize the seriousness of this extreme of Discourtesy it is 
only necessary to note the contemptible character of the discourteous 
Mirabella in Spenser's Book on Courtesy. Discourtesy here clearly 
includes the idea of celibacy. It should be remembered that Spenser's 
Courtesy is Aristotle's Friendliness — readiness to act as a true friend 

> III, V, 51. See also stanzas 50-55, especially 52. 
8 Note especially III, v, 54-55. See also III, vi, 1-3. 



r^ 



32 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

would act — and that, with both Aristotle and Spenser, Friendship 
includes love. In his argument to canto vii of Book VI Spenser 
tells us that we are to learn of "Fayre Mirabellaes punishment for 
loves disdaine decreed." Mirabella is cruel to her lovers and even 
boasts of the fact that they suffer and die because of their love for 
her. "She did all love despize." She is determined to live a life 
of celibacy. 

She was borne free, not bound to any wight. 

And so would ever live, and love her owne delight.^ 

Such is the Discourtesy, or Unfriendliness, which is one of the 
extremes in regard to Chasity. Mirabella is finally brought to justice 
by Cupid. 

Another passage in which Spenser represents Discourtesy and 
Celibacy as an extreme in regard to Chastity is in canto vi of the 
Book on Chastity. Venus has lost her Httle son, Cupid. In search- 
ing a wood for him, she comes upon her sister, Diana, of whom she 
makes inquiries. Diana is ungracious, intolerant: 

Thereat Diana gan to smile, in scorne 

Of her vaine plaint, and to her scoffing sayd; 
"Great pittie sure, that ye be so forlorne 

Of your gay sonne, that gives you so good ayd 

To your disports: ill mote ye bene apayd." 

But she was more engrieved, and replide; 
"Faire sister, ill beseemes it to upbrayd 

A doleful! heart with so disdainfull pride; 

The like that mine, may be your paine another tide. 



And ill becomes you with your loftie creasts, 

To scorne the joy, that Jove is glad to seek; 

We both are bound to follow heavens beheasts. 

And tend our charges with obeisance meeke. 

Spare, gentle sister, with reproch my paine to eeke."^ 

After Diana has made further insulting speeches, she is finally 
induced to join in the search for Cupid. While searching, Diana 
and Venus find Belphoebe and Amoretta, two babes born at a birth, 
Belphoebe being born first, and then Amoretta, to show that first 
comes maidenly chastity, "perfect Maydenhed," and then love and 

« VI. vii. 30-31. * III. vi. 21-22. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 33 

"goodly womanhed." Diana and Venus decide each to adopt one 
of the babes. 

Dame Phoebe [Diana] to a Nymph her babe betooke, 

To be upbrought in perfect Maydenhed, 

And to her selfe her name Belphoebe red : 

But Venus hers thence farre away convayed, 

To be upbrought in goodly womanhed.^ 

Venus takes Amoretta to be brought up in the Garden of Adonis, 
where, we are told. 

All things, as they created were, doe grow. 

And yet remember well the mightie word, 

Which first was spoken by th' Almightie lord, 

That bad them to increase and mvltiply} 

Perhaps Spenser's plainest condemnation of Celibacy and Insensi- 
bility, or Asceticism, is the episode dealing with Marinell in the 
Book on Chastity. Marinell is "a mighty man at arms." He 
eschews the love of women, for Proteus, the sea-god and prophet, 
has taught his mother to keep him from all womankind: 

For thy she gave him warning every day, 

The love of women not to entertaine; 

A lesson too too hard for living clay, 

From love in course of Nature to refraine: 

Yet he his mothers lore did well retaine, 

And ever from faire Ladies love did fly; 

Yet many Ladies fair did oft complaine, 

That they for love of him would algates dy: 

Dy, who so hst for him, he was loves enimy.' 

One of the first great victories of Britomart (Chastity) is her defeat 
of this sturdy champion. 

Though Britomart leaves Marinell for dead, his mother, Cymoent, 
by her magic finally revives him. We now learn that fair Florimell 
loves Marinell, but is scorned by him. In canto xi of Book IV 
Spenser gives a synopsis of the story of Marinell and Florimell, in 
order to continue it. The lovely Florimell, because she will not 
grant her love to the sea-god Proteus, is suffering horrible torments at 
Proteus' hands. 

And all this was for love of Marinell, 
Who her despysed (ah who would her despyse ?) 
And wemens love did from his hart expeU, 
And all those joyes that weak mankind entyse.* 

« III. vi. 28. « III. vi. 34. « III. iv. 25-26. « IV. xi. 5. 



34 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Clearly this is Celibacy and Insensibility, or Asceticism. Marinell 
is finally reformed by the love of Florimell. 

One more episode might be given here. It is in the opening canto 
of the Book on Chastity. Britomart, who fights for Chastity, and 
the Red Cross Knight (Holiness), who ''gave her good aid," come in 
their journey to "Castle Joyous," presided over by the witch Male- 
casta, called "the Lady of Delight." In the "sumptuous guize" 
of Castle Joyous the knights see 

The image of superfluous riotize. 
Exceeding much the state of meane degree.^ 

Smith and Selincourt define the term "meane," in this passage, as 
"middling"; and indeed the context seems to make any other 
interpretation impossible. 

Proof that the contemptible Mirabella of the Book on Courtesy 
is Discourtesy (if that can need special proof), and that Marinell of 
the Book on Chastity also illustrates Discourtesy — both being guilty 
of the serious offense of Cruelty, UnfriendHness, toward their lovers — 
may be had by comparing their conduct with the Courtesy of Brito- 
mart (Chastity) toward even the amorous "Lady of Delight," who, 
deceived by Britomart's armor, woos the Knight of Chastity in no 
modest manner. Britomart considers the feelings of other people 
and therefore does not rebuff the Lady of Delight until her conduct 
becomes outrageous: 

For thy she would not in discourteise wise, 
Scorne the faire offer of good will prof est; 
For great rebuke it is, love to despise. 
Or rudely sdiegne a gentle harts request.'^ 

Finally, a consideration of the characters in Book III shows 
plainly that Spenser treats Chastity as a mean, and that his extremes 
are the Aristotelian ones already mentioned. Marinell and Diana 
go to extremes in the direction of Discourtesy and Celibacy. Brito- 
mart, Belphoebe, Amoretta, and the true Florimell represent the 
mean. The extreme of Licentiousness is emphatically represented 
in the horrible Titan twins, Argante and Ollyphant, the hyena-Hke 
Brute, Proteus, Malecasta, the false Florimell, the infamous Helle- 
nore, and Busyrane. 

> III, i. 33. 2 III. i. 55. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 35 

In addition to treating Chastity as a mean, Spenser not only dis- 
cusses various phases of the virtue, after the manner of Aristotle, 
but draws from Aristotle the virtues and vices which he discusses in 
connection with Chastity. This fact throws Ught on an otherwise 
difficult passage in the Faerie Queene. In his continued discussion of 
Temperance,^ already referred to, Aristotle has a curious discussion 
of brutality, or unnatural vice. "There is more excuse," he says, 
"for following natural impulses, as indeed there is for following all 
such desires as are common to all the world, and the more common 
they are, the more excusable they are also."^ Again he says, "And 
if these are brutal states, there are others which are produced in some 

people by disease and madness Other such states again are 

the result of a morbid disposition or of habit." In this brutal or 
unnatural conduct he includes "unnatural vice," which he elsewhere 
refers to as "unnatural passion."* Compare this with Book III, 
canto ii, of the Faerie Queene. Britomart, who represents Elizabeth 
as well as Chastity, is madly in love with Artegall (Justice). In the 
midst of this fine compliment to the Queen we have the following 
curious passage put in the mouth of Glauce, Britomart's old nurse, 
after Britomart has confessed her love : 

Daughter (said she) what need ye be dismayd, 

Or why make ye such Monster of your mind ? 

Of much more uncouth thing I was affrayd; 

Of filthy lust, contrarie unto kind: 

But this affection nothing straunge I find; 

For who with reason can you aye reprove. 

To love the semblant pleasing most your mind, 

And yield your heart, whence ye cannot remove ? 

No guilt in you, but in the tyranny of love. 

Not so th' Arabian Myrrhe did set her mind; 

Nor so did BibUs spend her pining hart. 

But lov'd their native flesh against all kind, 

And to their purpose used wicked art: 

Yet played Pasiphae a more monstrous part, 

That lov'd a bull, and learned a beast to bee; 

Such shamefull lusts who loaths not, which depart 

From course of nature and of modestie ? 

Sweet love such lewdness bands from his faire companie.* 

^N. Eth.. VII. i and vi-vu. « Ibid.. VII. vii. • Ibid., VII. vi. « III. U. 40-41. 



36 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

I cannot resist giving another example of Spenser's conformity 
to Aristotle's scheme. In cantos ix and x of Spenser's Book on 
Chastity we have the story of Hellenore and Malbecco. The latter, 
at first a real character, in canto x becomes Jealousy in one of the 
most powerful of all Spenser's personifications. It is the unhkeness 
of Malbecco and Hellenore which causes their great unhappiness. 
This unlikeness includes the fact that Malbecco has reached the age 
of impotence, while his wife is young. Their unhappiness results 
in the "rape" of Hellenore (Helen) by Paridell (Paris). That their 
unhappiness is brought about by their inequality and unhkeness is 
clear from reading the cantos. I quote a few passages, however, 
which establish this point by literal exposition : 

But all his mind is set on mucky pelfe, 

Yet is he lincked to a lovely lasse, 



The which to him both far unequall yeares. 

And also far unlike conditions has; 

For she does joy to play emongst her peares. 

And to be free from hard restraint and gealous feares. 

But he is old, and withered like hay. 

Unfit faire Ladies service to supply. 

The privie guilt whereof makes him alway 

Suspect her truth, and keepe continuall spy 

Upon her with his other blincked eye; 

Ne suffreth he resort of hving wight 

Approch to her, ne keepe her company, 

But in close bowre her mewes from all mens sight, 

Depriv'd of kindly joy and naturall deUght. 

Malbecco he, and Hellenore she hight, 
Unfitly yokt together in one teeme. 

Fast good will with gentle courtesyes, 

And timely service to her pleasures meet 

May her perhaps containe, that else would algates fleet.^ 

Now there is a very close relation between the virtues of Chastity 
and Friendship, for Aristotle makes Friendship include love and the 
relation of husband and wife.^ Again, Aristotle repeatedly makes 

> III. ix, 4-7. 

» That Aristotelian Friendship includes love is clear from the whole of Book VIII 
of N. Eth. The Friendship of husband and wife is discussed specifically in chap. xii. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 37 

the point that perfect Friendship requires perfect equality and like- 
ness, and that any Friendship requires approximate equaUty and 
likeness. For example, he says: "In Friendship quantitative 
equality is first and proportionate second. This is clearly seen to be 
the case if there be a wide distinction between two persons in respect 
of virtue, vice, affluence, or anything else. For persons so widely 
different cease to be friends; they do not even affect to be friends."' 
Thus the lesson that the inequaUty and unlikeness of Malbecco and 
Hellenore is the cause of their destruction is straight Aristotehan 
doctrine. But this is not all. In the Politics, which is a continua- 
tion of the Nicomachean Ethics,^ Aristotle discusses the subject of 
marriage. At the beginning of chapter xvi of Book VI he says: 

In legislating about this association [marriage] he [the legislator] should 
have in view, not only the persons themselves who are to marry, but their 
time of life, so that they may arrive simultaneously at corresponding periods 
in respect of age, and there may not be a discrepancy between their powers, 
whether it is that the husband is still able to beget children and the wife 
is not, or vice versa, as this is a state of things which is a source of mutual 
bickerings and dissentions. 

And Aristotle reiterates the idea throughout the chapter. That this 
point is the part of the lesson to which Spenser gives emphasis is 
clear, not only from the story and the literal exposition, but also 
from the name Malbecco.' But even the idea of the impotent old 
husband's love of money and disregard of honor is Aristotelian. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, IV, iii, Aristotle says: "IlliberaUty is 
incurable; for it seems that old age or impotence of any kind makes 
men illiberal," and he repeats this thought in the Rhetoric* 

Again, Spenser makes it indisputably clear that reason is the 
determiner of the right course in respect of Chastity. Thus, as we 
have already seen, the old nurse Glauce, who in a measure represents 
Reason, or Prudence, assures Britomart (Chastity) that her conduct 

i N. Eth., VIII. Ix. 

» Not only the last chapter of the N. Eth. but the whole book prepares the way for 
the Politics. It is upon the relation between Morality and Reason, or Prudence, explained 
n the N. Eth., that the legislator of the Politics bases his laws. 

» Ital. becco, a buck, a goat, a cuckold; of. Marston, Malcontent, I, i, 118-20: 

M. Duke, thou art a becco, a cornuto. 

P. How ? 

M. Thou art a cuckold. 

* II. xlii. 



38 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

is right, for it is in accordance with Reason.^ On the other hand, 
we are told concerning the unholy passion of the witch's son : 
So strong is passion that no reason hears.'-' 

In discussing the virtue of Friendship, Spenser does not make 
much of the mean. But neither does his master. Aristotle only 
suggests that perhaps we ought to observe the mean in regard to the 
number of friendships which we undertake to maintain. Like 
Aristotle, however, Spenser does develop the virtue of Friendship by 
showing its opposites and by presenting various phases of the virtue 
and of its opposites. Thus he discusses Discord as well as Concord, 
Hate as well as Love,^ Falseness (Duessa) as well as "Friendship 
trew." He shows not only the friendship of the virtuous, as seen in 
such cases as that of Cambel and Triamond, but also the friendship 
of the vicious, friendship for gain, and so on, in such cases as the 
friendship of Blandamour and Paridell, which, in accordance with 
Aristotle's teaching, soon ends in strife.^ Professor Erskine^ asserts 
that Spenser's Book on Friendship "seems at first sight to treat only 
of jealousies and quarrels." He brings forward two sentences of 
Cicero from which he thinks Spenser must have learned that it was 
possible to present Friendship by showing its opposite. The fact 
is that in presenting Friendship by showing its opposite Spenser is 
not only doing what Aristotle did in everyone of his virtues, but is 
doing what he himself did in every book of the Faerie Queene. 

Moreover, Spenser discusses the same opposites and phases of 
Friendship that Aristotle discusses. For example, Aristotle deals 
with the friendship of the virtuous, which endures, and the friend- 
ship of the vicious, friendship for gain, and so on, which does not 
endure. We have already seen that Spenser represents these phases 
of Friendship. Again, Aristotle's Friendship is of three main kinds : 
the friendship of kinsmen, the friendship of love, including marriage, 
and friendship in the ordinary sense.^ In IV, ix, 1-3 of the Faerie 
Queene, Spenser gives a plain, literal exposition of these three kinds 

> III, ii, 40. 

sill. vii. 21. 

» IV. X, 34 and 32. 

<IV. ii, 13, 18. 

5 Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc, XXIII. 846. 

• See, for example, N. Eth.. VIII, xii. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 39 

of Friendship, as Professor Erskine has observed;^ and he reiterates 
this classification throughout the book.=^ Again, in connection with 
love Spenser illustrates the Aristotelian extremes of insensibility, 
or celibacy, unreasonable love, inconstancy, and licentiousness.' 
Once more, in the Book on Friendship, as well as in the Book on 
Chastity, Spenser follows Aristotle in making equaUty and likeness 
essential to Friendship. Friendship is impossible between Cambell 
and any one of the three brothers, Priamond, Diamond, and Tria- 
mond.^ But when Triamond, by receiving the spirits of his two 
brothers, becomes the equal of Cambell, the two become perfect 
friends.^ Spenser does not stop, however, at showing friendship 
between these equals of high degree ; he shows also friendship between 
two equal and like persons of low degree, the two squires in cantos 
viii and ix.® Finally, the most striking thing about Aristotle's dis- 
cussion of Friendship is his identification of this virtue with Concord 
in the State. He says: "Again, it seems that friendship or love 
is the bond which holds states together, and that legislators set 
more store by it than by justice; for concord is apparently akin to 
friendship, and it is concord that they especially seek to promote, 
and faction, as being hostility to the state, that they especially try 
to expel. "^ Even this phase of Aristotelian Friendship is emphati- 
cally presented in the Faerie Queene. In the first canto of his Book 
on Friendship Spenser presents Discord, the enemy of Friendship, 
whom the wicked witch Duessa has brought from hell "to trouble 
noble knights." 

Her name was Ate, mother of debate, 

And all dissention which doth dayly grow 

Amongst fraile men, that many a publike state 

And many a private oft doth overthrow. 



Hard by the gates of hell her dwelling is, 
Yet many waies to enter may be found, 

« Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc, XXIII, 849. 

»Note, for example, the "friends," "brethren," and "lovers" of IV. 

« See IV, ix, 21. 

♦ IV, ii-iii. 

' IV. iii, 26-37, especially 37. 

• See especially viii. 55-56, and ix, 10-11. . 
» N. Eth., VIII. i. 



40 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

But none to issue forth when one is in: 
For discord harder is to end then to begin. 

And all within the riven walls were hung 
With ragged monuments of times forepast, 
All which the sad effects of discord sung. 

Among these "monuments" are "broken scepters," "great cities 
ransackt," and "nations captived and huge armies slaine." "There 
was the signe of antique Babylon," of Thebes, of Rome, of Salem, 
and "sad Ilion." There were the names of Nimrod and "of Alex- 
ander, and his Princes five Which shar'd to them the spoiles that he 
had got alive." And there too were the "relicks .... of the 
dreadful! discord, which did drive The noble Argonauts to outrage 
fell." 

For all this worlds faire workmanship she tride, 
Unto his last confusion to bring, 
And that great golden chaine quite to divide, 
With which it blessed Concord hath together tide. 

Thus Spenser follows Aristotle in making Friendship include 
Concord in the State. The same idea comes out in Spenser's pres- 
entation of Concord in canto x: 

Concord she cleeped was in common reed. 
Mother of blessed Peace, and Friendship trew.^ 

In discussing his fifth virtue, Justice, Spenser expresses the mean 
in almost the exact words of Aristotle. Aristotle tells us that par- 
ticular Justice has to do with the goods of fortune.^ He defines 
Justice as follows: "Just conduct is a mean between committing 
and suffering injustice; for to commit injustice is to have too much, 
and to suffer it is to have too little."* In the proem to Book V 
Spenser in describing the Golden Age, when all men were just, says: 
And all men sought their owne, and none no more. 

Again, in Book V proper, Spenser's treatment of Justice as a 
mean is unmistakable. In canto ii we have the Gyant with his 
" huge great paire of ballance." Complaining that this world's goods 
are unjustly, because unequally, distributed, the Gyant proposes 
to weigh everything and make a just distribution. He has asserted 

» IV. X. 34. i N. Eth.. V. ii. » N. Eth., V. ix. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 41 

that he "could justly weigh the wrong and right," and Artegall 
(Justice) is testing him. Artegall finally tells him : 

But set the truth and set the right aside, 
For they with wrong or falshood will not fare; 
And put two wrongs together to be tride, 
Or else twofalses, each of equall share; 
And then together doe them both compare. 
For truth is one, and right is ever one. 
So did he, and then plaine it did appeare, 
Whether of them the greater were attone. 
Bui right sate in the middest of the beame alone. 

But he the right from thence did thrust away, 
For it was not the right, which he did seeke; 
But rather strove extremities to way, 
Th' one to diminish th' other for to eeke. 
For of the meane he greatly did misleeke.* 

At this point Talus, Artegall's iron squire (the iron hand of Justice), 
hurls the Gyant into the sea and drowns him. This mean which 
the Gyant "misleekes," and which Justice demands, is not simply 
a mean, but Aristotle's mean of Justice; for it is the mean in regard to 
the distribution of the goods of fortune. Moreover, the episode is 
Aristotelian in every particular. Aristotle teaches that equality as 
applied to Justice must be proportionate, not absolute. Justice, he 
holds, demands that the goods of fortune be distributed propor- 
tionately to the varying degrees of virtue in the citizens.^ He even 
protests particularly against an equalization of property and reiterates 
this protest.' 

Spenser's characters in this Book represent not only the mean 
but also the two Aristotelian extremes in regard to Justice: that of 
accepting less than rightfully belongs to one, and that of taking 
more. The first is represented by the Squire who is wronged by 
Sir Sanglier. Sanglier will not "rest contented with his right,"* 
but, "the fairere love to gaine," takes the Squire's Ladie and slays 

> V. li, 45-49. 

« N. Eth., Book V. Aristotle makes the same point in his discussion of Friendship. 
See N. Eth., VIII. ix. 

« See, for example, Politics, VIII, ix. 
«V, i, 17. 



42 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

his own. The Squire complains to Artegall. Brought before Arte- 

gall for judgment, SangHer defies his accuser, and testifies falsely 

that— 

neither he did shed that Ladies bloud 
Nor tooke away his love, but his owne proper good. 

Then 

Well did the Squire perceive himself too weake, 
To aunswere his defiaunce in the field, 
And rather chose his challenge off to breake. 
Then to approve his right with speare and shield. 
And rather guilty chose him selfe to yield.^ 

Only by imitating Solomon is Artegall able to discover to whom the 
live Ladie belongs and who is the murderer. The other extreme is 
represented by Sanglier, the robber Pollente, his daughter Munera, 
the Gyant with the huge ''ballance," and so on. Like Aristotle, 
Spenser puts the emphasis on the extreme of taking too much. The 
opposite of general Justice is represented by such characters as 
Grantorto (Great Wrong). The mean is seen in Artegall, Arthur, 
Britomart, and Mercilla (Equity). 

The various phases of Justice discussed by Aristotle are clearly 
presented by Spenser, such as distributive justice, corrective justice, 
retaliation, equity, and so on. Spenser also plainly makes Reason 
the determiner of the mean in respect to Justice. See, for example, 
his literal exposition of Justice in V, ix, 1 ff . 

Spenser's sixth virtue. Courtesy, is not only treated as a mean, 
but is exactly Aristotle's mean in regard to Friendliness. As we 
have already seen, Aristotle makes Friendliness consist in acting as 
a true friend would act.^ He makes its extremes Surliness, Conten- 
tiousness, Unfriendliness, on the one hand, and Flattery and Obsequi- 
ousness, or Complaisance, on the other. His friendly man is pleasant 
to live with, for he is free from Surliness or Contentiousness; but he 
will not yield his approval or withhold his condemnation when wrong 
conduct is under consideration. This is why he is like a true friend. 
Here we have exactly the character of Spenser's Knight of Courtesy, 
as is shown, for example, by Spenser's literal exposition of Sir Cali- 
dore's Courtesy, in VI, i, 2-3. It is plain that the Blatant Beast, 

1 V, i, 23. 24. 2 N. Eth., IV, xii. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE OX THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 43 

which Calidore, the Knight of Courtesy, is to bind, is one extreme 
in regard to Courtesy. Blandina' represents the opposite extreme. 
Calidore is, of course, the mean. Clearly Spenser puts the emphasis 
on Surliness, Contentiousness. We have already seen that Spenser 
develops the virtue of Courtesy by showing its opposites and by 
presenting various phases of the virtue and of its opposites. Further, 
that Reason is the determiner of the right course in regard to this 
virtue Spenser repeatedly makes clear. Enias, for example, appeals 
to Arthur, who here represents Courtesy, to rescue — 

Yond Lady and her Squire with foule despight 
Abusde, against all reason and all law.'^ 

Thus I have shown, beyond question, I hope, that Spenser follows 
Aristotle in essentials. Incidentally many correspondences in details 
have been pointed out, but lack of space makes it impossible to show 
how numerous such correspondences are. 

At one point Spenser interprets his Aristotle with considerable 
freedom. He assigns Magnificence to Arthur, "which vertue," he 
says, "for that (according to Aristotle and the rest) it is the per- 
fection of all the rest, and containeth in it them all," etc.^ Jusserand, 
conceiving that there is no warrant in Aristotle for any such state- 
ment, says, " He follows here, as a matter of fact, neither Aristotle 
nor the rest."* Jusserand sees in Spenser's statement evidence that 
the poet's recollection of Aristotle was vague, and he finally inti- 
mates — what Professor Erskine, following him, states — that Spenser 
probably never had read Aristotle's Ethics. 

Now suppose we could demonstrate that Spenser's memory did 
fail him at this point, that he actually was confused as to the Aris- 
totelian meaning of Magnificence {n€ya\oirpeiret,a). The fact would 
prove little. Greene,^ Herford,* and others have proved that Spenser 
more than once forgot the thread of his own story in the Faerie 
Queene. If a slip in memory is evidence that Spenser knew little of, 
and had probably never read, Aristotle's Ethics, there is equal 

» See especially VI, vi, 41-42. 
J VI, viii. 6; see also VI, iii, 49. 
« Letter to Sii- Walter Raleigh. 

♦ Mod. Phil., III. 382. 

6 Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc, IV. 173 ft. 

• See Professor Child's edition of Spenser's poems, note to I, i, 52. 



44 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

evidence that he knew little of, and had probably never read, the 
Faerie Queene. But there is no evidence that Spenser's memory did 
fail him at this point; and there is much evidence that it did not. 

Let us see what authority exists in Aristotle for Spenser's assign- 
ment of Magnificence to the morally perfect Arthur. First we must 
decide what is Aristotle. Jusserand says: "Three treatises on 
morals have come down to us under the name of Aristotle; one alone, 
the Nicomachean Ethics, being, as it seems, truly his; the others 
appear to be a make-up, drawn from his teachings by some disciples."^ 
This is a kind of ex post facto judgment. Friedrich D. E. Schleier- 
macher, the great critic and Aristotelian scholar, born one hundred 
and seventy years after Spenser's death, held that the Magna M or alia 
was the source of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Eudemian 
Ethics.^ Only recently have scholars begun to agree that the 
Nicomachean Ethics is probably the most truly Aristotelian of the 
three. An uncritical scholar like Spenser would certainly have made 
no such distinction. He would simply have accepted all three as 
the teachings of Aristotle, as they really are. 

There is ample warrant in Aristotle for the idea that one of the 
moral virtues may be thought of as containing all the others. For 
example, it is clear from the Nicomachean Ethics that Magnanimity 
(I have elsewhere used the term Highmindedness) would fill this 
requirement;^ for although Magnanimity, or Highmindedness, is 
essentially love of great honor, it includes moral perfection in the 
fullest sense. Again, on the same authority Justice, in the broad 
sense, includes all the moral virtues so far as one's relations to others 
are concerned. But under Spenser's plan, set forth in the letter to 
Raleigh, the virtue assigned to Arthur could have no Book; and 
Spenser was too much interested in church matters and in politics 
not to write on Holiness and Justice. Besides, there would be a kind 
of impropriety in omitting the former; probably the Scripture text 
"Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all 
these things shall be added unto j^ou" had something to do, not only 
with Spenser's writing on Holiness, but also with his treating it 

» Mod. Phil., Ill, 374. 

2 The Works of Aristotle, Translated into English under the Editorship of W. D. Ross: 
Magna Moralia, Ethica Eudemia, De Virtutibus et Vitiis (Oxford, 1915), Introd., p. v. 
' N. Eth., IV, vii, and II. vii. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 45 

first. It was highly desirable then to reserve Highmindedness, or 
Magnanimity, and Justice for what we know as the First and Fifth 
Books. (If, as Jusserand holds, Spenser had already written the 
Book on Holiness when he completed the plan set forth in his letter 
to Raleigh, it was absolutely necessary to leave Highmindedness, 
Magnanimity, as the virtue of the Knight of Holiness; for it would 
do admirably for him, and no other virtue would do.) Thus if 
Spenser could assign some other virtue to Arthur, he could make the 
plan of his poem more elastic. 

Now there was another virtue which was peculiarly adapted to 
Arthur, provided it could be made to include all the vu-tues— namely, 
Magnificence. According to the Nicomachean Ethics, " Magnificence 
is suitable to ... . persons of rank and reputation and the like, 
as all these advantages confer importance and dignity."^ Rank? 
Arthur's was the highest. Reputation? Spenser tells us in the 
letter to Raleigh that it was because of Arthur's reputation that he 
chose him as the hero of the Faerie Queene, he "being made famous 
by many men's former works." Again, the magnificent man labors 
for the public good and strives for honor. Once more, " The motive 
of the magnificent man in incurring expense will be nobleness; for 
nobleness is a characteristic of all the virtues." " In a word. Magnifi- 
cence is excellence of work on a great scale. "^ What could better 
describe Arthur's great works ? 

But can Magnificence be made to include all the virtues ? Al- 
though in a strict sense it is simply a mean between meanness and 
vulgar display in the use of money, it seems to include nmch more. 
Moreover, there is, as we have already seen, abundant authority in 
the Nicomachean Ethics for taking the virtues not only in a strict 
but also in a broad or metaphorical sense. If Magnificence were 
similarly interpreted, it would be "the perfection of all the rest and 
contain in it them all." But all this is from the Nicomachean Ethics. 
What do ArisCotle's other works on morals say about Magnificence ? 
The Magna Moralia says: "But there are, as people think, more 
kinds of Magnificence than one; for instance, people say, 'His walk 
was Magnificent,' and there are of course other uses of the term 

» IV. iv; II, vii. 

2 Cf. Aristotle's discussion of tlie magniflcent man, .V. Eih., IV. iv-v. 



46 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Magnificent in a metaphorical, not in a strict, sense."' This is 
certainly suggestive. And according to the Ethica Eudemia, ''The 
magnificent man is not concerned with any and every action or choice, 
but with expenditure — unless we use the term metaphorically."^ 
Here is a plain suggestion that Magnificence could be taken in a 
broad sense, could be made to include "any and every action or 
choice." Such is Magnificence, "according to Aristotle." Who 
"the rest" are is not quite clear, but Spenser's favorite poet, Chaucer, 
says in his Persones Tale, "Thanne comth Magnificence, that is to 
seyn, whan a man dooth and perfourneth grete werkes of goodnesse"' 
— exactly what Arthur "dooth." 

We come now to Jusserand's third and last main argument. Jus- 
serand contends that Spenser did not get his virtues from Aristotle 
and proceeds to argue that he did get them from his friend Lodo- 
wick Bryskett, and from Piccolomini's Istitutione morale, through 
Bryskett. He thus finds it necessary to get over Spenser's own 
assertion that he did take his virtues from Aristotle. He argues that 
"Spenser showed as a rule no minute accuracy in his indications of 
sources and models, and he did not display more than usual in this 
particular case."* The first part of the proposition is true. But to 
find that "as a rule" Spenser showed no "minute accuracy" is a 
vastly different thing from concluding that a solemn statement con- 
cerning the substance of his whole Faerie Queene is "misleading, 
every word of it." 

Let us examine Jusserand's argument^ that Spenser derived his 
virtues from Bryskett, and from Piccolomini through Bryskett. 
Long after Spenser's death Bryskett published A Discourse of Civil 
Life,^ a translation from Giraldi Cinthio's three dialogues Dell' 
allevare et ammaestrare i figluoU nella vita civile. It is an account of 
the best way to rear children and includes a discussion of moral virtues 
in which the number twelve is mentioned. That Spenser knew this 
Discourse Jusserand concludes from the fact that Bryskett represents 
Spenser as one of the interlocutors in the conversation which furnishes 
the machinery of the book. Before the day of Spenser and Bryskett, 

1 I. xxvi. 4 Mod. Phil., Ill, 374. 

s III. vi. 6 Ibid., Ill, 378-80. 

» 736 (§ 61). • London. 1606. 



ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON THE "FAERIE QUEENE" 47 

Piccolomini, taking Aristotle and Plato as his masters, had written his 
Istitutione morale, in which he discussed eleven moral virtues and 
added the statement that Prudence, which he classed as an intellectual 
virtue, might be considered a moral virtue. Jusserand holds that 
"twelve was a kind of sacred number and was sure to come in." 
In his Discourse Bryskett states that when he came to the question 
of the moral virtues he found that Cinthio had treated them "some- 
what too briefly and confusedly," and adds, "I have therefore, to 
help mine own understanding, had recourse to Piccolomini."^ Jus- 
serand takes this statement as "positive testimony" that Spenser 
knew the substance of the Istitutione morale. J usserand concludes : 
"From such books and such conversations, from other less solemn 
talks which he and Bryskett, interested in the same problems, could 
not fail to have, Spenser derived his list of virtues and his ideas 
regarding a list of twelve." 

Now it is quite possible that Spenser, the genius, should get his 
ideas from Lodowick Bryskett, a man of no great parts. It is also 
possible, however improbable, that Spenser road Bryskett's book 
twenty years before it was published. But there is no proof, or even 
evidence, that such was the case. And, by the same token, there is 
no evidence that Spenser knew Piccolomini 's Istitutione. Professor 
Erskine has proved, what most careful students must already have 
suspected, that Bryskett's "conversation" which furnijshes Jusse- 
rand's "positive testimony" is a myth. In putting his discussion 
into the form of a dialogue in which he himself, Spenser, the Bishop 
of Armagh, and others are the speakers, Bryskett is simply following 
a literary convention of the day. It is impossible to suppose all the 
characters of the dialogue actually together at Bryskett's cottage.^ 
Besides, Erskine finds that the speeches which Bryskett puts into 
the mouths of Spenser and the good Bishop of Armagh are trans- 
lated straight from Giraldi Cinthio. He finds further that even 
if the dialogue had been a real one it could have had little to do with 
Piccolomini, for it contains only one passage from him. It may be 
added that Bryskett could have taken the idea for the machinery 
of his Discourse from Spenser's Mother Hubberds Tale. In both eases 

■ Mod. Phil.. Ill, 378-80. 

» Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc, XXIII, 831-50. 



48 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

the author is sick, his friends come in to see him, and the conversation 
which is later given to the reader takes place. The only difference 
is that Bryskett is so anxious to take the credit of authorship that 
he commits the absurdity of having the sick man, Bryskett himself, 
do the talking, which consists in lecturing on philosophy for three 
days. 

In the next place, even if Spenser had known Bryskett's Discourse, 
he could not have taken his virtues and the plan of his Faerie Queene 
from it. For one reason, Spenser's and Bryskett's virtues are unlike 
in nature. For example, Bryskett, like Plato, makes Prudence one 
of the moral virtues, whereas Spenser, as we have already seen, fol- 
lows Aristotle in making it that intellectual virtue which determines 
the mean in the case of each of the moral virtues. Again, Bryskett 
makes Magnanimity a subordinate virtue, whereas Spenser, like 
Aristotle, makes it include all the moral virtues. Moreover, Spenser's 
basis of classification is quite different from Bryskett's. In Brys- 
kett's classification, to quote his own words, "There are .... four 
principall vertues .... from which four are also derived (as 
branches from their trees) sundry others to make up the number 
twelve,"^ whereas Spenser, like Aristotle, makes one of his virtues 
include all the others. Finally, even the agreement in point of 
number, which Jusserand would make much of, does not exist. 
Bryskett's number is twelve, Spenser's thirteen. And Spenser's 
plan of his poem, set forth in the letter to Raleigh, would have been 
impossible with any other number of virtues than thirteen. Thus it 
is plain that Spenser did not get his virtues from Bryskett. 

> Quoted by Jusserand, Mod. Phil., Ill, 380. 



"MUTABILITY" 

Little is known of the history of the fragment called "Muta- 
bility." The fragment was first pubUshed in 1609, ten years after 
the poet's death. It then appeared under the following title, which 
all editors have retained: "Two Cantos of Mutability: Which, both 
for Forme and Matter, appeare to be parcell of some following Booke 
of the Faerie Queene, under the legend of Constansie. Never before 
imprinted." Not another word of explanation was given. 

The fragment has been a puzzle to editors. Dr. Grosart in his 
biography of Spenser, Volume I of his nine-volume edition of Spenser's 
works, speaks of it as "fragments" which show that Spenser had 
started on a "second six" books, to round out the proposed twelve. 
Thus he makes it a part of the Faerie Queene, and seems to expect to 
find other fragments. But by the time he has reached Volume VIII 
of his massive edition, and is ready to print the fragment, he has 
changed his mind. He now prefixes to the Two Cantos on Mutability 
the following note: 

It is doubtful whether they were meant to form part of the Faery Queene. 
They make a charming independent poem on " Mutability" — one of Spenser's 
favorite themes. 

Professor Child contents himself with printing them under the head- 
ing, "Book VII( ?)." The Oxford edition disposes of the whole matter 
in a single sentence. It says simply: "The fragmentary Book VII 
appeared first in the Folio of 1609." Professor Dodge says that the 
best reason for thinking that the fragment was intended to form part 
of the Faerie Queene is found in stanza 37 of the first of the "Two 
Cantos."! 

Besides the matter of its relation to Aristotle, there are, then, 
other interesting questions connected with "MutabiUty." Was it 
written as an independent poem? If not, where does it belong? 
Was it intended to be a part of the Faerie Queene f 

It is hard to believe that "MutabiUty" was written as an inde- 
pendent poem. It is a unit, a great poem, in itself, as everyone must 

I Cambridge ed., 1908, p. 131. 

49 



50 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

observe. But it is the two stanzas of canto viii that complete it. 
And these could easily have been added after the fragment was 
detached from the poem for which it was originally intended. Or 
they may well have been a part of the fragment; for they are in 
accord with Spenser's usual practice in the Faerie Queene, of beginning 
a canto with reflections on the preceding one. One reason for 
regarding "Mutability" as a fragment is the numbering of the 
cantos. If it was written as an independent poem, why the num- 
bering as we have it— "Canto VI," "Canto VII," "The VIII. Canto, 
unperfite"? Closely connected with this is the presence of the 
proems which introduce cantos vi and vii. Surely these features are 
not the work of the printer. Again, a sufficient reason for doubting 
that what we have here was written as an independent poem is the 
fact that Spenser tells us in "Mutabihty," vi, 37, that this is part of 
a poem deaUng with "warres and Knights," and in the part that we 
have no knights appear. 

It seems clear that "Mutabihty" is part of an epic. Stanza 37 
of canto vi, especially when compared with Faerie Queene, I, Prol. 1, 
can hardly leave a doubt on this point. The stanzas are as follows : 
"Mutabihty," vi, 37: 

And, were it not ill fitting for this file, 

To sing of hilles and woods, mongst warres and Knights, 

I would abate the sternenesse of my stile, 

Mongst these sterrie stounds to mingle soft delights; 

And tell how Ai-lo through Dianaes spights 

(Being of old the best and fairest Hill 

That was in all this holy Islands hights) 

Was made the most unpleasant, and most ill. 

Meane while, O Clio, lend Calliope thy quill. 

Faerie Queene, I, Prol. 1 : 

Lo I the man, whose Muse whilome did maske, 

As time her taught, in lowly Shepheards weeds. 

Am now enforst a far unfitter task. 

For trumpets sterne to chaunge mine Oaten reeds, 

And sing of Knights and Ladies gentle deeds; 

Wliose prayses having slept in silence long. 

Me, all too meane, the sacred Muse areeds 

To blazon broad emongst her learned throng: 

Fierce warres and faithful loves shall moralize my song. 



"MUTABILITY" 51 

Note that in "Mutability," vi, 37, Spenser not only shows that what 
he is now writing is part of a poem dealing with " warres and Knights," 
but he speaks of the " sternenesse " of his present "stile" and of 
"these Sterne stounds," just as in Faerie Qiieene, I, Prol. 1, where 
he is passing from his pastoral Shepheardes Calender to his epic 
Faerie Queene, he speaks of changing his "Oaten reeds" for "trumpets 
Sterne." Again, in "Mutability," vi, 37, besides the mention of the 
sternness of his epic style, Spenser gives unmistakable testimony 
that he is here writing epic poetry. Wishing "mongst these sterne 
stounds" to tell the story of how Arlo became cursed, the poet 
prays Clio, the muse of history, to lend her quill to Calliope, the 
muse of epic poetry. It is therefore clear that what has been written 
up to this point is conceived as epic poetry— the work of Calliope. 
If, then, "Mutability" was written as part of an epic poem, does 
it belong to the Faerie Queene or to some other epic ? First, what 
do we know of Spenser's plans for writing epic poetry ? We know, 
from the famous letter to Raleigh, that Spenser had planned to write 
six more books on moral virtues. There were to be twelve books in 
the first part of Faerie Queene. We know, too, from the same source, 
that, besides "these first twelve books," Spenser had it in mind to 
write an "other part" to the Faerie Queene, which probably would 
have been twelve books in length, making twenty-four books in the 
completed Faerie Queene. This "other part" was to be on political 
virtues. 

In addition to the plans set forth in the letter to Raleigh, Spenser 
makes certain other references to epic poetry which he intends to 
write. Professor Child has pointed out that " Spenser once or twice 
gives intimation of a purpose of commemorating the wars between 
the Faerie Queene and the Paynim King, that is, Queen EUzabeth 
and Philip of Spain." He cites the Faerie Queene, I, xi, 7, and I, 
xii, 18, and Spenser's verses to the Earl of Essex, prefixed to the 
Faerie Queene, and adds: "This intention, however, was never fully 
carried out: all that the poet wrote upon the subject will be found in 
the last cantos of the fifth book."i But in these passages Spenser 
seems to be thinking of a discussion which he expects to introduce 
somewhere in the Faerie Queene, perhaps in Book V, perhaps in 

1 The Political Works of Edmund Spenser (in British Poets), I (1855), 231. 



52 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Book XII, possibly in the Second Part, which is to deal with poHtical 
virtues. The following line from the verses to Essex would seem to 
indicate a position at the close of the Faerie Queene: "To the last 
praises of this Faerie Queene." So far as we know, Spenser had no 
other epic poetry, than what we have mentioned, in mind or under 
way. 

Apparently, then, "Mutabihty" was written as a part of the 
Faerie Queene, either of "these first twelve bookes" or of "the other 
part." And there are several additional facts which make this con- 
clusion probable. The fragment is in the form of the Faerie Queene. 
It is divided into cantos like the Faerie Queene. The cantos are 
summarized in a proem, as is the case in the Faerie Queene. And 
the stanza form is that of the Faerie Queene. Again, a comparison 
of "Mutability," vi, 37, and Faerie Queene, I, Prol. 1, already 
quoted, indicates that the fragment was written as a part of the 
Faerie . Queene. Note in both passages the reference to knights, 
"warres," and the sternness of style demanded by epic poetry. 
Spenser's usual meaning for the word "warres" is combats between 
two or more knights.^ Furthermore, all the characters of the 
fragment are frequently mentioned in the Faerie Queene. Even its 
personification of rivers is a theme which is dwelt on at length in the 
Faerie Queene.^ And the "records" of Mutability's "antique race 
and linage ancient" are found registered "in Faery Land."^ 

Seeing that "Mutability" was probably written to occupy some 
place in the Faerie Queene, one cannot refrain from asking. Where ? 
This question is more difficult than the preceding ones. ReaHzing 
that the known facts are insufficient for a conclusive answer, one 
may nevertheless suggest a probable explanation. 

The fragment may be, not, as the printer guessed, "parcell of 
some following Booke of the Faerie Queene," but rejected cantos 
from a preceding book. The fact that it is the middle of a book, not 
the beginning, as is shown by the numbering of the cantos, suggests 
this. It is improbable that any such vast amount of Spenser's 
poetry was lost as would be represented by five cantos of the Faerie 

1 See, for example, F.Q., V, ii, 17. 

2 IV, xi. 

« "Mutability," vi, 2. 



"MUTABILITY" 53 

Queene, or five such cantos as the two we have in the fragment — 
some twenty-seven-hundred verses. And it is improbable that 
Spenser would begin a book in the middle. If it were his practice 
to outline a book in detail before writing in extenso, he might be 
moved to develop a topic in the middle or at the end of a book before 
he had developed the beginning, and he would, of course, be able to 
assign the proper number to each canto. But there is no evidence 
that that was his practice; and there is evidence, both internal and 
external, that it was not. Professor Erskine, basing his reasoning 
on Books III and IV and Spenser's letter to Raleigh, has pointed out 
that Spenser could have had no outline of Book IV at the time when 
the first three books were published.^ But there are other reasons 
for thinking that the fragment is rejected cantos from a preceding 
book. Change, or Fortune, was a favorite theme with Spenser. In 
whatever he wrote he could be counted on to discuss Change. We 
do not have to argue as to whether he could have put a discussion of 
Change in any one of Books I-VI; he did put it in, most notably in 
Books III and V. It would be easy for him in any of his books to 
launch into a long discussion of Change. 

Before attempting to see whether the fragment would fit in 
some one of the completed books of the Faerie Queene, we should 
observe, however, that Spenser would not be likely to remove so 
great a portion of a book as is represented by the fragment without 
making some changes in what preceded and followed the rejected 
portion. It is conceivable that the fragment was part of a first 
draft of some book the remainder of which was reworked and 
given to us. A reason for rejection might be the great length to 
which the fragment runs without carrying on any thread of the story 
of the Faerie Queene. There are digressions in Books II and IV 
which are nearly a canto in length, or half as long as the fragment; 
but Guyon and Arthur read the long chronicles, and Marinell and 
his mother are present at the marriage of the Medway and the 
Thames. Again, the fragment might be rejected on the basis of 
tact or patriotism, as we shall see later. Finally, the fact that they 
are a unit in themselves, suitable to be published as a separate poem, 
would make rejection easy. 

> Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc, XXIII, 831-50. 



54 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

How would the fragment fit in Book II, Spenser's discussion of 
Temperance? It will be remembered that the frapnent is divided 
into "Canto VI/' "Canto VII," and "The VIII. Canto, unperfite." 
How would these cantos fit between canto v of Book II and what is 
now canto vi of Book II ? At the close of II, v, Cymochles (Incon- 
tinience) has been roused by Atin from his bed of lust and led to 
avenge his brother Pyrochles ' defeat and apparent death at the hands 
of Sir Guyon, the Knight of Temperance. He rides forth determined 
"to beene avenged that day" on Sir Guyon, He is impatient to 
avenge the defeat of his brother.^ So ends canto v. In II, vi, 
Cymochles meets the beautiful Phaedria (Temptation to Incon- 
tinence) before he reaches Sir Guyon. He is easily led by Phaedria 
through the Lake of Idleness to her wandering island (Incontinence), 
where he forgets all about his purpose to avenge his brother's death. 
It would seem that between Cymochles' determination to avenge 
the defeat of his brother and his being led into Incontinence in which 
he forgets all about his brother — here it would seem that the frag- 
ment would fit neatly. It is Spenser's practice to begin a canto with 
reflections on what has passed, in the story, and what is to follow. 
Once launched into a discussion of Change, or Constancy, he might 
be led to pursue the subject to some definite stopping-place. It 
would be in accord with Spenser's practice to drop the story of 
Cymochles for a long time. He might not realize until later that 
he had here carried on no thread of the story of the Faerie 
Queene. 

Would the fragment fit in Book III ? There is a curious resem- 
blance between the material of cantos vi-vii of the fragment and that 
of cantos vi-vii of Book III. In III, vi-vii, we have Diana and 
Belphoebe, who, as we know from the letter to Raleigh, represent 
Chastity and Elizabeth. In the fragment, vi-vii, we have the moon- 
goddess Diana, or Cynthia, or Phoebe, whose throne is attacked by 
Mutability. Besides the moon-goddess Diana, we have in the 
fragment a nineteen-stanza account of Diana as a virgin huntress. 
The privacy of her bath is invaded by the licentious Faunus, for 
which Faunus is punished and the country cursed. Again, in III, 



UI.v. 



"MUTABILITY" 55 

vi-vii, we have not only a discussion of Change, but a development 
of the idea that Change is in a Cycle, and that essentially there is 
no Change. The fragment, vi-vii, consists of a discussion of Change 
as a Cycle, and the same conclusion is reached as in III, vi-vii. 
Compare III, vi, 46-47, and III, vi, 36-41, especially 37-38, with the 
fragment, especially with fragment vii, 58. Once more, in both III, 
vi-vii, and the fragment we have an impressive use of the figure of 
the Wheel. Compare III, vi, 32-33, with the fragment, vi, 1. Yet 
again, in III, vi-vii, we have the horrible lustful giant twins, Argante 
and Olyphant, who certainly represent Aristotle's "unnatural vice," 
as is clear from a comparison of III, vii, 47-50, with the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book VII, and who are descendants of Titan, who fought 
against Jove. They "feed [their] fancy with delightful change." 
In the fragment. Change, or Mutability, is a descendant of Titan, 
who fought against Jove. Important ideas in both III, vi-vii, and 
the fragment, vi-vii, are Nature, cyclic Change, Time, and Death. 

If one could accept the printer's improbable conjecture that 
"Mutability" is a moral discussion on Constancy, that would be 
another reason for placing the fragment in Book II or III, in both 
of which Spenser discusses Constancy. If the fragment is on Con- 
stancy in the moral sense of Continence and Steadfastness, it is on 
Temperance or Chastity, and belongs to Book II or III. Spenser 
would certainly not write another Book so like Temperance and 
Chastity. 

How would the fragment fit in the Book on Justice? Nothing 
impressed the Renaissance like the rise and fall of individual men, the 
downfall of men at the height of their prosperity, the turn of the 
wheel of Fortune. Now in canto v of Book V, which the fragment, 
according to the numbering of its cantos, would follow, Artegall, 
the hero of the Book and the equal of Arthur, has fallen from the 
state of one of the greatest knights in the world to that of bond 
servant to a woman. She has degraded him from his rank of 
Chivalry, dressed him in women's weeds, and set him to do woman's 
work. But Artegall is not merely the hero of a tale. He is Arthur, 
Lord Grey, who had been Spenser's personal friend, patron, and 
hero in real life. How naturally, then, would the opening stanza of 
canto vi of the fragment follow Artegall's fall in canto v of Book V, 



56 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

especially in view of the fact that Spenser habitually begins a canto 
with reflections on the preceding one: 

What man that sees the ever-whirling wheele 
Of Change, the which all mortall things doth sway, 
But that therby doth find, and plainly feele. 
How Mutability in them doth play 
Her cruell sports, to many mens decay ? 

The proem might not be written until the canto was finished, as 
is indicated by the fact that the "unperfite" canto viii has no proem. 
The word "decay" would not necessarily mean death, for the same 
word is applied in V, v, to those who, like Artegall, have fallen from 
knighthood and become subject to Radigund.^ Perhaps the refer- 
ences to Fortune in V, iv, 47; V, v, 5; V, v, 36, and V, v, 38, are too 
much the usual thing in Spenser to be significant, though Radigund's 
and Artegall's anxiety as to how Fortune will decide their combat 
seems so. 

But Artegall represents also Justice. His downfall, therefore, 
represents in some sense the miscarriage of Justice. Does it suggest 
the recall of Lord Grey from the Lord-Deputyship of Ireland and the 
reversal of his policy by Sir John Perrot, which, as we know, from 
the last canto of Book V, and especially from Spenser's Veue of the 
Present State of Ireland, the poet condemned ? We are told that 
Radigund's treatment of Artegall is just, because he had given his 
word that if she defeated him he would obey her; but we are made 
to feel that it is contemptible. If following cantos were rejected, 
V, v, might be changed; but even as it now stands, woman's govern- 
ment, save Elizabeth of course, is plainly condemned as against 
Nature.2 

The probability of the rejection of the fragment on the ground 
of tact or patriotism will now be clear. If the long discussion of 
Change, or Mutability, grew out of the downfall of Artegall at the 
hand of a woman and Artegall's humiliation under woman's govern- 
ment, so that the discussion would be likely to suggest not only a 
condemnation of Lord Grey's recall but also of Elizabeth's govern- 
ment, it might well occur to Spenser, on second thought, or be sug- 
gested to him by Raleigh, that here is a delicate matter. And the 

>V, V. 21. sV, V, 25. 



"MUTABILITY" 57 

same would be true if the discussion of Mutability grew out of any- 
similar event. Again, the Cynthia, or Phoebe, or Diana, of the 
fragment could not fail to suggest Elizabeth, not only because all 
the court commonly used these terms to flatter Elizabeth, but also 
because Spenser himself had so used them in the Faerie Queene and 
had pointed out in the letter to Raleigh that they did refer to Ehza- 
beth. In view of this fact, the nineteen-stanza account, in the frag- 
ment, of Faunus' spying on Diana at her bath might, for example, 
be a reason for the rejection of the fragment. 

I have tried to suggest that the fragment called "Mutability" 
may have been written as a part of one of the completed books of 
the Faerie Queene. If it be argued that it does not fit perfectly in 
any of them, this answer seems worthy of consideration: Spenser 
probably rejected it just because it did not fit perfectly. 

Finally, the long discussion of Change, or Mutability, might 
conceivably have grown out of the downfall of some great character 
in the "other part" of the Faerie Queene, which was to deal with 
political virtues. But in the absence of any books on poUtical 
virtues, this solution seems improbable. 

We come now to the question of Aristotle's influence on "Muta- 
bility." Here it will be well to review the plot of the poem. Change 
has brought sin and death and injustice into the world, and subdued 
the earth to her rule. Having done this much, she aspires to rule 
the heavens. She begins by attempting to displace Cynthia, or 
Phoebe, or Diana, the moon-goddess. Jove interferes, and Muta- 
bility boldly tells him that she intends to have his throne too, and 
all the gods'. She bases her claim on the fact that she is a descendant 
of Titan, whom Jove had dispossessed. Jove starts to try the case; 
but Mutability, feeling that he would be partial to his own interest, 
appeals to the God of Nature. Heaven and Earth assemble, and 
Nature takes the judgment seat. In addition to her claim through 
inheritance. Mutability, or Change, pleads that in reality she is the 
supreme ruler; for earth, air, fire, water; seasons, months, day and 
night; life and death; the planets in the heavens; and even the 
gods, including Jove himself, are subject to her law of change. 
Nature is long silent, but at length gives her decision in few words. 
It is true, she says, that all things hate steadfastness, and are changed. 



58 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

But essentially they are not changed. They change in a cycle; 
"they are not changed from their first estate"; they only dilate their 
being and perfect themselves. Change does not rule over them; 
"but they raigne over change, and do their states maintaine." 
Mutability shall not displace Jove, but shall give up her aspira- 
tions and content herself to be ruled by Nature. Thus shall Change 
be governed until the time comes when we shall all be changed. 
After that there will be no more Change. 

Several of the ideas of the fragment are strikingly like those of 
Aristotle. For example, the idea of cyclic Change and of the rule 
of Nature is repeatedly expressed in the Nicomachean Ethics and 
in the Politics. In Politics VIII, xii, Aristotle says: 

In the Republic the subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates, but 
not satisfactorily. For there is no particular treatment of the revolution 
incident to his best or primary polity. He assigns as a cause the fact that 
nothing in the world is permanent; all things change in a certain cycle, .... 

Again, in Politics, Book I, Aristotle discusses at length the rule and 
subordination which is in accordance with Nature. He shows that 
the principle of rule and subordination prevails throughout Nature. 
For example, he says : 

Wherever several parts combine to form one common whole .... the 
relation of ruler and subject invariably manifests itself. And this fact 
which is characteristic of animate things is true of Nature generally; for 
even in inanimate things there is a sort of rule and subordination, e.g. in 
harmony.^ 

Connected with Spenser's fragment, and with Aristotle's study 
of virtue, there is an interesting bit of theology. It is "mortall" 
things, Spenser tells us in the very first sentence of the fragment 
and throughout the poem, that are subject to Change. In that 
happy condition before Change broke the laws of Nature and brought 
sin and death into the world, that is, before man became mortal, man 
and all things enjoyed a state which was without change and without 
motion.2 And, Spenser tells us, clearly with a part of the fifteenth 
chapter of First Corinthians in mind. 

Time shall come that all shall changed be, a 

And from thenceforth, none no more change shall see. * 

1 Politics, I, V. 

2 Compare the opening stanzas of the fragment, especially stanzas 5 and 6, with 
the close, especially vii, 59, and viii, 2. 



"MUTABILITY" 59 

In other words, there is to be a return to the pre-Mutability state. 

Then, commenting on this fact, which is announced by Nature, 

Spenser says: 

Then gin I think on that which Nature sayd, 
Of that same time when no more Change shall be, 
But steadfast rest of all things firmly stayd 
Upon the pillours of Eternity, 
That is contrayr to Mutabilitie: 
For, all that moveth, doth in Change delight: 
But thence-forth all shall rest eternally 
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight: 
that great Sai)baoth God, graimt me that 
Sabaoths sight.^ 

At the close of Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
gives a brief and unmistakably clear expression of this doctrine of a 
changeless and motionless state of bliss. It precisely matches, in 
this respect, the closing stanza of Spenser's poem on Mutability, or 
Change. It is as follows: 

The same thing is never constantly pleasant to us, as our nature is not 
simple, but there exists in us a sort of second nature, which makes us mortal 
beings. Thus if one element is active, it acts against the nature of the other, 
and when the two elements are in equilibrium, the action appears to be 
neither painful nor pleasant. If there were a being, whose nature is simple, 
the same action would alwajTS be supremely pleasant to him. 

It is thus that God enjoys one simple pleasure everlastingly; for there 
is an activity not only of motion but of immobility, and pleasure consists rather 
in rest than in motion. 

Much of Aristotle's teaching concerning the active and the specu- 
lative life, and the superiority of the latter, had probably become so 
merged with Christian teaching as to lose its identity. The emphasis 
placed by Spenser on a motionless state of bliss, at the close of 
"Mutability," suggests, however, that the poet had particularly in 
mind the ideas which we have just quoted from Aristotle — not 
solely the common doctrines of the church on eschatology. And 
this is the more probable in view of the fact that, as we saw when 
studying the Faerie Queene, Spenser had elsewhere made frequent 
use, not only of the ideas of the Nicomachean Ethics, but of this very 
book. 

> "MutabUity," viii, 2. 



60 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

There are two modern works which conceivably may have had 
some influence on the fragment called "Mutability." Professor 
Ohver Elton, in Modern Studies,^ says, "With all [theirl difference of 
spirit, we seem to find an echo of Bruno in Spenser's [" Mutability "]." 
He has in mind mainly the Spaccio de la Bestia trionfante, which, he 
finds, was written and published during Bruno's stay in England, 
1584-85. 

The Spaccio is an allegorical proposal for the overthrow of the 
current social ethics and the establishment of a fresh code of human 
excellence. There is first a vague catastrophe. Then the reigning 
vices and follies, which are represented by the constellations, are 
displaced by virtues. This new heaven represents a new society 
on earth. 

The scene is Olympus. The highly immoral Jove, feeling age and 
impotency coming on, and dreading death, and change into something 
which shall have no memory of Jove, decides on a reformation, 
especially of other people. On the anniversary of the fall of the 
giants he calls the gods together and requires them to show repentance 
by completely changing the chart of the heavens. This change is 
the dispatch of the triumphant beast, which consists of all the old 
constellations, that is, of all vices and folhes. Jove perseveres until 
the whole heavens have been changed, each vice being displaced 
by its opposite virtue. 

Professor Elton finds that both Spenser and Bruno play with 
large conceptions of change and recurrence, and both present a 
conclave of the gods led by Jove and discomfited by the feeling of 
decay. The machinery of the two pieces is alike thus far. But the 
idea of cycHc change which essentially is not change is absent from 
Bruno's allegory. Professor Elton admits that the idea is an old 
one, but finds that it had been rephrased in Bruno's Eroici Furori. 
Bruno's rephrasing of this idea, which Professor Elton quotes, is as 
follows : 

Death and dissolution do not befit this entire mass, of which the star 
that is our globe consists. Nature as a whole cannot suffer annihilation; 
and thus, at due times, in fixed order, she comes to renew herself, changing 
and altering all her parts; and this it is fitting should come with fixity of 
succession, every part taking the place of all the other parts Thus 

London, 1907, chap. i. 



"MUTABILITY" 61 

all things in their kind have the vicissitudes of lordship and slavery, felicity 
and infelicity, of the state that is called life, and the state that is called 
death; of light and darkness, and of good and evil. And there is nothing 
which by natural fitness is eternal but the substance which is matter.* 

Concerning the first point of similarity to which Professor Elton 
calls attention, namely, that both writers play with large concep- 
tions of change and recurrence, this may be said: If this fact proves 
that Bruno influenced Spenser, then Bruno's influence on Spenser 
was far-reaching. For not only does Spenser discuss change in 
everything he wrote; but he several times deals with large concep- 
tions of change and recurrence. In the Faerie Queene, III, vi, 36 ff., 
for example, Spenser tells how all things take their substances from 
Chaos; catch a form; pass into life; live, die, decay, and return 
to Chaos; only to pass into other forms: 

For in the wide wombe of the world there lyes, 
In hatefuU darknesse and in deepe horrore. 
An huge eternal Chaos, which supplyes 
The substances of natures fruitfuU progenyes. 

All things from thence doe their first being fetch, 
And borrow matter, whereof they are made, 
Which when as forme and feature it does ketch, 
Becomes a bodie, and doth then invade 
The state of life, out of the griesly shade. 
That substance is eterne, and bideth so, 
Ne when the life decayes, and forme does fade, 
Doth it consume, and into nothing go. 
But changed is, and often altred to and fro. 

The substance is not chaunged, nor altered. 

But th' only forme and outward fashion ; 

For every substance is conditioned 

To change her hew, and sundry formes to don, 

Meet for her temper and complexion: 

For formes are variable and decay. 

There follows a discussion of the enemy, "wicked Time." See in 
the same canto, 46-47, the account of the lover, who 

All be he subject to mortalitie. 

Yet is eterne in mutabilitie. 

And by succession made perpetual]. 

> Modern Studies, p. 33. 



62 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Again, in the long prologue to the Book on Justice, see Spenser's 
account, not only of the change from the age when all were just to 
the present age of injustice, but also of vast changes in the heavens, 
which changes are related to the moral change. Even the sun, 

Foure times his place he shifted hath in sight, 
And twice hath risen, where he now doth West, 
And wested twice, where he ought rise aright. 

Once more, in the second canto of the Book on Justice, 29 ff., we 
have an argument and reply strikingly like those in the fragment 
called "Mutabihty." The Gyant with the "huge great paire of 
ballance" justifies a political revolution on the ground that earth, 
fire, air, and water have all encroached on each other. The decision, 
given by the Knight of Justice, is that the change is only apparent; 
in reality they have not encroached on each other. 

Another thing may safely be said : It is not necessary to suppose 
that Spenser got his machinery from Bruno, Not only was Spenser 
writing on change long before there was any possibility of influence 
from Bruno; but the theme was a favorite one in the Middle Ages 
and especially in the Renaissance.^ See, for example, at the end of 
the "Two other very Commendable Letters," now printed with the 
Faerie Queene, "Certaine Latin Verses, of the frailtie and Muta- 
bility of all things, saving only Vertue." These "Verses" were 
printed in 1580, four years before Bruno's allegory was written and 
five years before it was published. Concerning the fact that both 
Spenser and Bruno describe "a conclave of the gods led by Jove," 
an important part of the second of Professor Elton's two points of 
similarity, it may be answered that Spencer describes such a con- 
clave in his Muiopotmos. Moreover, we have here not only a con- 
clave, but a trial, as is the case in the fragment called "MutabiUty." 
There is a debate between Minerva and Neptune as to who shall be 
god of Athens. Jove tries the case in the presence of the assembled 
gods. It should be added here that a conclave of the gods is a com- 
monplace in literature. It has been a popular theme since the days 
of Homer and Virgil. See Aeneid x and Demeter, vss. 313 ff. See 

> See, for example, the Romance of the Rose, Ellis' tr., pp. 170-71 and 208-64, or 
Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde or Monks Tale. See also Mod. Lang. Notes, VIII (1893)^ 
230 flf. and 235 flf., and Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc, VIII (1893), 303 fl.,and Neilson's Court 
of Love and Chambers' Medieval Stage. 



"MUTABILITY" 63 

also Triggs's edition of Lydgate's Assembly of Gods, 1905, E.E.T.S., 
Introduction, pp. lii ff., and O. H. Moore's article in Mod. Phil., 
XVI (1918), 170. It ought to be said further that in Bruno's 
allegory there is no trial, and Change is not personified. And, 
finally, so far as cyclic change is concerned, it is found, as we have 
already seen, in Aristotle. 

There is another piece of modern writing which may possibly 
have influenced the machinery of Spenser's fragment: The Rare 
Triumphs of Love and Fortune. This play is in places strikingly 
like Spenser's fragment called "Mutability." There is a quarrel 
between Venus and Fortune as to how much power each has, the 
quarrel being started by Fortune. The two goddesses appear before 
Jupiter and the assembled gods to argue the case. After some argu- 
ment Jupiter decides to allow Fortune and Venus to try their powers 
on a pair of faithful lovers, Fortune to do her worst and Venus her 
best, and the one who shows the greatest might to be allowed the 
sovereignty. First one and then the other seems superior, until 
finally Jupiter decides that in this and all other cases they must 
compromise and not thwart each other. They unite to make the 
lovers happy. An interesting argument made by Fortune is her 
assertion that all things— the sea, the air, even the heavens, the 
stars — feel her scars. ^ 

It will be observed that this play is like Spenser's fragment in 
several particulars. In the play, as in Spenser's poem. Fortune is 
personified; it is Fortune who starts the contest; there is a trial; 
and the trial is presided over by Jupiter, or Jove, in the presence of 
the assembled gods. The decision is much like that in the fragment; 
just as in the fragment Change must operate in accordance with 
Nature, so in the Rare Triumph of Love and Fortune the two con- 
testants must henceforth work in harmony. And, finally, both in 
the play and in Spenser's fragment, Fortune, or Change, bases her 
claim to sovereignty on the argument that the sea, the air, even the 
heavens, the stars, feel her might. 

I know of nothing which makes it improbable that Spenser 
should have read The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune. There 
are facts which make it doubtful whether he ever saw Bruno's 

> For this play see Dodsley's Old English Plays, Hazlitt. Vol. VI. 



64 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

Spaccio and Furori. As Professor Elton admits, Bruno's works 
made little if any impression on England until long after Bruno and 
Spenser were dead; they were not studied even by small and select 
circles. From all that is known of Sidney's life and thought and 
character — and much is known — we may be sure that Sidney could 
have had no sympathy with the teachings of the Spaccio. Spenser 
was in Ireland during Bruno's stay in England. It is not impossible 
that Sidney, to whom the Spaccio was dedicated, may have sent 
Bruno's allegory to Spenser, as Professor Elton suggests, though if 
he had read it before sending it he would have found its teachings 
repulsive to himself and would have known they would be so to 
Spenser. 

But whether Spenser read Bruno or The Rare Triumphs of Love 
and Fortune, or both, this much is certain: he did not draw his 
ethical teaching or his theology from them. The Rare Triumphs of 
Love and Fortune is not an ethical or theological discussion. The 
Spaccio is a study of ethical and theological matters; but its teach- 
ings are diametrically opposed to Spenser's views. The whole 
spirit of the Spaccio is opposed to Spenser's thought and nature, as 
Professor Elton recognized. Spenser is chivalric; Bruno is, in the 
Spaccio, realistic, to the extent of the frankest recognition of human 
needs. Spenser is reverent; Bruno is irreverent, impious. Spenser 
everywhere makes loving use of the Old and New Testaments, and 
he thinks of the Deity and of the pagan gods as having human 
form and attributes ; Bruno is violently against Jewish and anthropo- 
morphic theology. Professor Elton fully recognizes that Bruno's 
teachings could not appeal to Spenser. For example, he says, "His 
[Bruno's] ethics did not appeal to Spenser," the singer of Chivalry; 
and again, "The ethical ideal that results [from the study in the 
Spaccio] is .... a corrective to that set forth in the Faerie Queene." 

It appears, then, that although the discussion of "Mutability" 
in the fragment forms in no proper sense a part of Spenser's treat- 
ment of the "twelve moral virtues of Aristotle," it is composed of 
ideas derived from Aristotle — ideas discussed by him in close con- 
nection with the virtues, moral and poUtical. 



A VEUE OF THE PRESENT STATE OF IRELAND 

Spenser's A Vexie of the Present State of Ireland is a practical state 
paper. It has the definite object of justifying Lord Grey and his 
policy and deploring the reversal of that policy. It is not a proposal 
for the establishment of an ideal government, but for deaUng with 
conditions which are already fixed — such as the state of civihzation 
of the Irish, the great difference between the Irish and the EngUsh 
peoples, and the government of the former people by the latter. It 
is not a theoretical discussion of morality and politics. 

Nevertheless there are everywhere throughout the Veue reflec- 
tions from Aristotle. Indeed the practical nature of the Veue 
is itself justified by arguments which are to be found in some of 
Aristotle's more practical chapters. In the Veue, Spenser's char- 
acters, Eudoxus and Irenius, speak as follows, Irenius representing 
Spenser's own opinion: 

Eudox.: Her Majestie may yet, when it shall please her, alter anything 
of thos former ordinances, or appoynt other lawes, that may be more 
both for her own behoofe, and for the good of that people. 

Iren.: Not so: for it is not so easy, now that things are growne into an 
habit and have ther certain course, to change the channell, and turn 
ther streames an other way; for they may have now a collourable 
pretence to withstand such innovasion, having accepted other lawes and 
rules alredy. 

Eudox.: As for the lawes of England, they are surely most just and most 
agreeable both with the government and with the nature of the people : 
how fklls it out then, that you seme to dislike of them, as not so meete 
for that realm of Ireland, and not onely the common law, lent also the 
statutes and acts of parlament, which were specially provided and 
intended for the onely benefit thereof. 

Iren.: I was shewing you by what means, and in what sort, the positive 
lawes were first brought in and established by the Norman Conqueror; 
which were not by him devised, nor applyed to the state of the reahne 
then being, nor as it might best be, (as should by lawgivers be principally 
regarded,) but were indede the very lawes of his owne country of 
Normandy: the condicon whereof, how far it differeth from this of 
England, is apparent to every least judgment. But to transfer the 
same lawes for the governing of the realm of Ireland, was much more 
65 



66 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

inconvenient and unmete: In Ireland .... they were otherwise 
effected, and yet not so remayned, so as the same lawes, me seemes, 
can ill fit with their disposicion, or work that reformacon that is wished: 
for lawes ought to be fashioned unto the manners and condicons of the 
people, to whom they are ment, and not to be imposed upon them 
according to the simple rule of right .... ffor he that would transfer 
the lawes of the Lacedemonians to the people of Athens should find a 
great absurdity and inconvenience, . . . .^ 



Iren.: I doe not thinke yt convenient, though .... to change all the 
lawes and make newe; for that should bread great trouble and confu- 
sione, aswell in the Englishe now dwellinge and to be planted, as alsoe 
in the Irishe. For the Englishe, having bene trained upp alwayes in 
the English government, will hardely be enduced unto any other, and 
the Irishe wilbe better drawne to the Englishe, then the Englishe to 
the Irishe governmente. Therefore since wee cannot nowe applie 
lawes fitt to the people, as in the first institutione of commone-welthes 
it ought to be, wee will applye the people, and fitt them to the lawes, 
as it most conveniently maye be. The lawes therefore we resolve shall 
abyde in the sam sorte that they doe, both Commone Lawes and 
Statutes, onely suche defects in the Comone Lawe, and inconveniens 
in the Statutes, as in the beginninge wee noted, and as men of deep 
insights shall advise, may be changed by other newe actes and ordy- 
nances to be by a Parlyamente there confirmed. ^ 

Compare this with the following passages from Aristotle's Politics: 
Alterations [of the laws] seem to require no little caution. Where the 
improvement is but slight compared with the evil of accustoming the citizens 
lightly to repeal the lawes, it is undoubtedly our duty to pass over some 
mistakes whether of the legislature or the executive, as the benefit we shall 
derive from the alteration will not be equal to the harm we shall get by 

accustoming ourselves to disobey authority For all the potency of 

the law to secure obedience depends upon habit, and habit can only be 
formed by lapse of time; so that the ready transition from the existing laws 
to others that are new is a weakening of the efficacy of law itself.* 



The good legislator and the true statesman should keep his eyes open not 
only to the absolutely best polity but also to the polity which is best under 
the actual conditions He should understand the polity which is 



» Grosart's edition, lines 390-444. 
» Ihid., lines 6176-98. 
» Politics, II, viii. 



"A VEUE OF THE PRESENT STATE OF IRELAND" 67 

most appropriate to the mass of states, especially as the great majority of 
political writers, even if successful in their treatment of the other points, 
utterly miss the mark of practical utility. For it is not only the absolutely 
best polity which is the proper subject of consideration, but also that which 

is possible in any given case But our modern writers either aspire 

to the highest polity, for which a number of external advantages are indis- 
pensable, or, if they describe a form more generally attainable, put out of 
sight all existing forms except the favored one and pronounce a panegjTic 
upon the Lacedaemonian or some other polity. What we want however 
is to introduce some new system which the world will easily be induced and 

enabled to accept as an innovation upon the existing forms 

The true statesman should be capable of coming to the rescue of existing 

polities He should discern the best laws and the laws appropriate 

to each form of polity, as it is the laws enacted which should be, and in fact 
are universally relative to the pohties rather than the polities to the laws.* 

The passages quoted from Spenser will show the practical nature 
and something of the scope of the Veue. A comparison of the 
excerpts from the Veue with those from the Politics will show that 
Aristotle's and Spenser's ideas are practically identical. It will be 
noted that both writers are opposed to changing the laws save for 
weighty reasons; that both stress the importance of habit in con- 
nection with obedience to the law; that both make a distinction 
between the ideally perfect polity and the best government that 
may be had under given conditions, and hold that the lawmaker 
should give consideration to the latter; that both recognize that it 
is necessary to consider what kind of government or laws a people 
can be induced to accept; and that both insist that the laws ought 
to be adapted to the particular polity or government for which they 
are intended. Besides the agreement in principle, there are certain 
agreements in detail which indicate that Spenser had the Politics in 
mind. In the discussion from which the excerpts are taken, Spenser, 
like Aristotle, names Solon, Lycurgus, and the Lacedaemonians. 
Again Spenser refers to the warlike nature of the Lacedaemonians, 
as Aristotle does in an earlier passage. Yet again, in insisting that 
the laws should be adapted to the polity for which they are meant, 
Aristotle complains that 

our modern writers either aspire to the highest pohty, for which a num- 
ber of external advantages are indispensable, or, if they describe a form more 

1 Politics. VI, 1. 



68 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

generally attainable, put out of sight all existing forms except the favored 
one and pronounce a panegyric upon the Lacedaemonian or some other 
polity; 

and Spenser, in making the same point, says, 

Lawes ought to be fashioned unto the manners and condiconsof the people, 
to whom they are ment, and not to be imposed upon them according to the 
simple rule of right .... ffor he that would transfer the lawes of the 
Lacedaemonians to the people of Athens should find a great absurdity and 
inconvenience. 

Such points of resemblance to Aristotle as we have here pointed 
out are to be found throughout the Veue, in connection with the 
discussion of education,^ the supremacy of the law,^ and many other 
topics. 

> Compare the Veue, ed. A. B. Grosart, pp. 27. 28, 238, 239, with the Politics, V. i; 
IV, xiv, xv; II, v; and VIII, ix. 

« Compare the Veue, p. 59, with the Politics, III, xv, xvi; II, ix; and III, xi. 



THE SHEPHEARDES CALENDER AND THE MINOR 
POEMS 

Much of the serious matter in The Shepheardes Calender and 
the minor poems is ecclesiastical. Nevertheless, the influence of 
Aristotle is unmistakable. 

In the Calender the July eclogue is plainly AristoteUan. It 
teaches the doctrine of the mean. For this opinion we do not have 
to depend upon ThomaUn's emblem: "In medio virtus"; or upon 
E.K.'s statement, in the gloss, that, "He taketh occasion to prayse 
the meane and lowly state .... according to the saying of olde 
Philosophers, that vertue dwelleth in the middest, being environed 
with two contrary vices." The teaching of the eclogue itself is 
too clear to be misunderstood. But not only does the eclogue teach 
the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean; it teaches the mean concern- 
ing ambition, which mean is one of the Aristotelian virtues. 

Again, in the October eclogue there is Aristotelian influence. 
Spenser refers to the influence of music on the soul, and E. K. cites 
Aristotle and Plato as authorities on the subject. For Aristotle's 
long discussion of the influence of music on the soul and character 
see the Politics, V, v. 

Spenser's Fowre Hymnes are Platonic, as all ambitious love 
poetry of the period was expected to be; but throughout the rest 
of the minor poems there is a more or less important Aristotelian 
influence. For example, in Mother Hubberds Tale, lines 143 to 145, 
Aristotle's two standards of right, political and natural justice, are 

named: 

There is no right in this partition, 

Ne was it so by institution. 

Ordained first, ne by the law of Nature. 

Again, in Muiopotmos, line 178, "All change is sweet," reflects 
Aristotle's "But change, as the poet says, is 'the sweetest thing 
in the world.'''^ Yet again, in Mother Hubberds Tale, hnes 126 and 
1131, we have as a standard the Aristotelian "rule of reason." 

« Nicomachean Ethics, VII, xv. 



70 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE ON SPENSER 

This brings to a close my study of the influence of Aristotle's 
Politics and Ethics on Spenser. To the argument that any given 
point of similarity between Aristotle and Spenser may be purely a 
coincidence there is no answer. But these points of similarity are 
too numerous to be the result of chance. Aristotle certainly had a 
very considerable influence on Spenser. 



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